



The North and ESDP

The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden

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Introduction: The North and ESDP

Klaus Brummer

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has progressed rapidly since its creation in 1999. Nonetheless, the gap between ambitious declarations on the one hand and shortfalls in both actions and capabilities on the other hand remains obvious. As ESDP is pursued on an intergovernmental basis, the EU's member states are the ones who decide about the direction, speed and intensity of European cooperation in this field. Against this background, the Bertelsmann Stiftung has initiated a survey series under the heading "Overcoming National Impediments to ESDP." The series aims at identifying those interests and attitudes that are responsible for member states' action – or inaction – in ESDP. Box 1 shows how this lead question was operationalized for the country studies.

Box 1: Possible National Impediments to ESDP

- **National Prestige, Past Glory, Self-perception:** Historical and cultural legacies as impediments for the development of ESDP? Global aspirations: A mismatch between self-perception and reality?
- **Foreign and Security Policy Imperatives:** Two different tales: National interests and European interests? Widening the transatlantic rift: European integration vs. transatlantic relationship?
- **Threat Perception and Response:** Today and tomorrow: Who is a threat, and what is a threat? National autonomy in security matters, or ESDP to the rescue?
- **Public Opinion: Materialism, post-materialism, security:** What do people actually want? Clinging to pacifism or unease about the use of force: Lopsided public discourse on security and defense issues?
- **Government and Bureaucracy:** Turf battles: Who is in charge of ESDP? Together or apart: Cooperation or confrontation within and between ministries?
- **Party Politics and Parliament:** Does a lack of interest, expertise and capacity explain why parliament members grow weary of dealing with ESDP? Highly responsive: How do parties adapt to public opinion on Europe?
- **Economy: It's the money, stupid:** What are the constraining effects of state and defense budgets? Protecting national champions vs. creating a European defense market?
- **Military:** The political and the military agenda: Worlds apart? Lack of military capabilities – lack of commitment?

The first discussion paper of the “Overcoming National Impediments to ESDP” series dealt with the so-called “Big 3,” namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The second contribution focused on the South, with Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain put in the spotlight. Now, this third brochure discusses positions and interests vis-à-vis ESDP of six states from northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The remainder of the introduction highlights some cross-cutting themes that some or all of the following country surveys refer to as (potential) impediments to – or incentives for – a country’s engagement in ESDP. The specific situations and conditions in the countries under scrutiny are discussed in detail in the subsequent country studies by Andres Kasekamp and Viljar Veebel on the Baltic states, Gorm Rye Olsen on Denmark, Hanna Ojanen on Finland and Gunilla Herolf on Sweden.

Cooperation, not Integration

The six countries under scrutiny show little inclination to change the basics of European cooperation in security and defense, that is, to move from the present intergovernmental to the supranational level by establishing common European defense. Three arguments are put forward against such a move. First, the EU still lacks credibility as a security actor, particularly when it comes to areas other than crisis management, above all territorial defense. Second, for smaller countries, common defense along with a move away from unanimity to majority voting inevitably entails the risk of being easily overruled. Hence, the retention of a veto in security and defense is considered an important safeguard for the country’s interests being taken into account on the European level. Third, “national peculiarities” come into play. After decades of external domination, the Baltic countries are not prepared (yet) to relinquish control over decision-making in security and defense once again. In Finland and Sweden, the policy of non-alignment does not hamper the two countries’ contributions to ESDP’s present crisis management endeavors, but it does impede participation in common European defense. Last but not least, Denmark opted out because ESDP is perceived as a potential threat to the country’s national and cultural identity.

At the same time, the Danish opt-out seems to limit the country’s room for maneuver vis-à-vis ESDP to a lesser extent than might be expected. Indeed, the Danish opt-out appears to have been interpreted and applied in a rather permissive way that gives the country considerable leeway despite its official nonparticipation. The major driver for such a rather pragmatic interpretation of the opt-out has been the costs that ESDP places on the country. But opting out means that influencing the development of ESDP, which nonetheless affects Denmark and to which the country might eventually accede anyway, gets considerably more difficult. Moreover, nonparticipation in ESDP limits Denmark’s options to contribute to objectives that the country – a committed security player in general terms – pursues both in principle and in practice. Even though they would serve Danish interests, if activities (particularly in the field of crisis management) are pursued within the EU/ESDP framework, an active contribution becomes

impossible. As result, the fear is that Denmark might lose attractiveness as a partner in security affairs. This has led the country to extract as much substance from the opt-out as possible. Nevertheless, as in the countries mentioned above, the question is not about common defense; instead, it is about whether to join ESDP in the first place.

Reciprocity, Unity and Responsiveness

The country reports reveal an overwhelmingly pragmatic view among these countries concerning the underlying rationale for their participation in ESDP. Above all, each perceives involvement in ESDP as a tool to enhance its own security. More specifically, there seems to be a strong expectation of reciprocity. The logic is that if one gives support to other countries, for instance by participating in certain missions, the latter are hoped (if not to say expected) to reciprocate in kind in times of the country's own need.

In addition to enhancing security, participation in ESDP is also expected to increase solidarity among EU countries. However, the substance of "solidarity" does not seem to be entirely clear. Indeed, one of the country reports makes the distinction between "solidarité effective" and "solidarité de principe," with only the former being the type the country in question (Finland) seems willing to subscribe to. In any case, a prerequisite for solidarity is that all member states must have the feeling that their interests are acknowledged at the European level. Particularly the report on the Baltic states suggests that this is not the case, though.

The Baltic states suffer from the comparative disadvantage of being a "latecomer." When they acceded to the EU in 2004, the foundations of ESDP had already been established. As result, the perception in the Baltic countries is that their interests are not sufficiently included in ESDP. For instance, the landmark document of Europe's security and defense policy, the European Security Strategy of 2003, pays little attention to energy security or territorial defense, both of which are crucial for Baltic countries (as well as for Finland). Furthermore, Baltic countries seem to have little interest in ESDP operations in Africa. On the other hand, they would like to see more European engagement in the space of the former Soviet Union. The report on the Baltic states, therefore, calls for an adjustment of ESDP, along with the ESS, in order to better reflect the interests of the new member states, thereby enhancing the Union's responsiveness. This argument corroborates a point made in the report on Sweden, which emphasizes the positive effect on the country's attitude toward ESDP that resulted from the acceptance of the Swedish-Finnish initiative to move decision-making on the Petersberg tasks from the Western European Union (WEU) to the EU.

Although the concept of solidarity is unclear and the level of responsiveness of European countries to the wishes of their fellow EU members leaves room for improvement, the maintenance of unity within the EU is perceived as imperative in all countries in focus. Conversely, divisions among EU member states are considered to have detrimental effects at least on two dimensions. First, they might put a country's security at risk. As mentioned above, the EU is perceived as adding leverage to countries' national security. This added value would diminish, if

not entirely disappear, in case of ruptures among EU states. Second, by making countries choose sides for certain groups, divisions among member states also limit a country's political room for maneuver. For instance, the Baltic countries would like to steer clear of facing another decision "pro EU or pro United States" similar to one they faced regarding the Iraq war – not least as they might once again choose the U.S. side, which continues to be considered crucial for the Baltic states' security.

Telling and Selling ESDP Right

Last but not least, several of the country reports highlight the interplay between the future development of ESDP and public opinion. The interconnection is most obvious in the Danish case, where a political commitment was made to hold a referendum if the opt-out was to be lifted. Whether a referendum will be held anytime soon is an open question, though. Speaking against such a move are the intricacies of minority government as well as uncertainties concerning the robustness of the existing majority support among Danes for lifting the opt-out, that is, whether the majority would indeed hold during an actual vote.

On a more general level, several reports point to the fact that ESDP does not receive the attention and publicity it deserves in EU member states – if there is a discussion about ESDP at all. A conclusion to be drawn from the reports is that to remedy this situation, an information campaign should be initiated. That campaign should highlight the comparative advantages of the EU as a security and defense actor, above all its ability to combine civilian and military means in a comprehensive approach to security. In addition, past and present success stories of ESDP must be told to the people, above all successful ESDP operations (e.g., in the Balkans). Particular emphasis should be placed on ESDP operations' contribution to the economic and social well-being of Europeans.

The Baltic States and ESDP

Andres Kasekamp / Viljar Veebel

1. The Legacy of History

The foreign and security policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been conditioned primarily by their historical experience. All three countries emphasize that they are not “newly independent” states, but restored states. They enjoyed two decades of independence before being annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany, which allocated them to the Soviet sphere of influence. During World War II they fell under Nazi rule before being re-conquered by the USSR. Unlike the Warsaw Pact countries, which maintained their sovereignty under Soviet dominance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were eliminated from the map of Europe.

Their living memories of independent statehood, democracy and the market economy, along with the fact that most Western countries never formally recognized their annexation, differentiated the Baltics from other Soviet Socialist Republics and gave them a head start in the process of reforms initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. The public recovery of historical memory during 1987–88 rapidly served to delegitimize Soviet rule and fueled the drive toward independence. With the recognition of their independence in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the political rupture was almost complete. The withdrawal of the last Russian troops from Baltic territory in 1994 completed the process. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s Russia claimed that former Soviet republics formed a special category of states known as the “near-abroad” over which Russia still had special influence.

Having struggled hard to win their freedom from the Soviet Union, Balts were acutely aware of the need to preserve their newly won sovereignty. The three countries are determined to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s, when their diplomatic isolation led to their absorption by a hostile neighbor at the outbreak of World War II. The lesson drawn was the need to anchor themselves firmly in the Euro-Atlantic community.¹ The entire process of EU and NATO accession was couched in terms of a “return to the West” from which they were forcibly cut off for half a century.

The Baltic states’ strategy in the EU accession negotiations that lasted from 1998 to 2002 was to be the best pupil in the class. The fact that Estonia had started negotiations one year earlier spurred the Latvians and Lithuanians to catch up in the race to successfully close negotiation chapters. Unlike some other candidate countries, such as Poland, which could be confident of inclusion in the next enlargement, the Balts were in a more precarious geopolitical situation and poorer starting position as former republics of the USSR; they had to rely on success in fulfilling the “objective criteria.” Baltic decision-makers clearly sensed that they did not have the luxury of

time and that the window of opportunity might not stay open for long. The Balts were eager to distance themselves as quickly as possible from the Soviet legacy and from Russia's influence. This common understanding allowed the political elite to construct a remarkable consensus around the need to speedily implement the necessary reforms.

2. The Baltic States as EU Members

In the debates in the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Balts, as well as other Eastern Europeans, often took positions defending intergovernmentalism and the status quo, fearing that the draft constitution proposed by Convention President Giscard d'Estaing might lead to a "superstate." In this they were close allies of the British. This favoring of intergovernmental positions also applied specifically to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), where there was a strong reluctance to countenance any further deepening.² Underlying this position were the explicit anxiety that NATO could be weakened and the unstated fear that the old EU member states might force the Balts into some unacceptable accommodation of Russia. In addition to the natural anxieties of small states, the historical experience of the Baltic countries made them particularly wary of the potential of further integration to create more powerful EU institutions.

The most common refrain of Baltic Euro-skeptics has been "Why join a new union after having struggled so hard to achieve independence from another union?" Their recent negative experience inside the Soviet Union made Balts more skeptical than other candidate countries regarding grand blueprints for "ever closer union." It has been easy to score emotional points in the debates on EU membership by drawing superficial parallels between some of the bureaucratic excesses of the EU and the absurdities of the USSR. Indeed, of all the East European candidate countries, Estonia and Latvia were the two with the lowest level of support for EU membership in the referenda held in September 2003.

This initial stance of zealously guarding newly achieved sovereignty was revised after the first months of actual experience of membership. The Balts relearned the lesson that securing a reputation as a "good European" was important in achieving one's goals in the EU. Five factors played a role in reorienting the Baltic states from skeptics to enthusiasts of the community method. First, the fears prior to accession proved to be unfounded. Second, the countries gained self-confidence by participating in the daily activities of the Union. Third, the economic boom brought the Baltic economies the fastest growth in the EU. Fourth, the Baltic countries saw the lack of coordinated EU responses to Russia. Fifth, rejection of the constitutional treaty by French and Dutch voters in 2005 was widely interpreted as a negative appraisal of the enlargement and globalization. This overturned common assumptions regarding who are the chief beneficiaries of the EU.

Public support of the EU has grown since accession. In Estonia, it even reached a record high in 2007. All the mainstream political parties have been solidly pro-EU. The parliaments of the Baltic

states have all ratified the Constitutional Treaty, with Lithuania actually the first EU member state to do so. While there was no overwhelming public support for the Constitutional Treaty, the three Baltic parliaments nevertheless all voted to support the Treaty without any significant debate.

The Baltic states are now in favor of both widening and deepening the EU. They have always been strongly in favor of further enlargement in principle. All three governments have been staunch supporters of Turkish membership—partly in gratitude for Turkish support of Baltic NATO membership, but also because Turkish membership would certainly strengthen the EU as a global security actor. They are also very supportive of Croatia's and other Western Balkan countries' eventual membership and particularly enthusiastic about promoting the candidacy of Ukraine.

European defense cooperation and peacekeeping missions are dealt with as separate issues by Baltic political parties. Defense cooperation and membership in NATO and the EU are mostly debated in the framework of transatlantic cooperation and seen as an essential and positive part of national security. Most party programs set transatlantic partnership as the main national priority, and it is not the subject of party policy debates. Most single-minded in this question are right-wing conservative parties, but even social democrats have not questioned the necessity of defense cooperation in public debates.

The second trend is that while NATO has been supported since the restoration of independence, support for the EU (and ESDP) has grown during 2004–2007 in all three Baltic states. Similarly to opinion elsewhere in the Union, support for the ESDP is high: 85 percent in Lithuania, 82 percent in Estonia, and 76 percent in Latvia.³ In fact, it is the most popular EU policy. This, however, does not reflect knowledge of the workings of the ESDP, but rather the strong desire of the Baltic nations for security in the traditional sense. While the Baltic governments have overcome their initial reluctance regarding the further use of the community method in general, this statement only partly applies to the ESDP. Though the Balts are ready for a more integrated approach, they are not yet prepared for a supranational ESDP; that is, they still wish to keep the right of veto in big decisions.

Peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions are debated in separate contexts. Here the first set of questions concerns restricted capabilities and rational use of existing capabilities. The second set of questions concerns the status and purpose of peace-enforcement missions, mainly concentrating on the participation in operation "Iraqi Freedom," the U.S.-led "coalition of the willing." Some politicians and journalists have questioned the legitimacy and necessity of the mission. This topic has been raised by some opposition parties, while the governing coalition parties have solidly supported NATO and EU membership and all the missions undertaken thus far. Public opinion generally is very supportive of the EU and NATO in all the three Baltic countries but has at the same time been more skeptical about the military missions conducted by the two organizations. However, public opinion is mostly only aware of and interested in the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the Iraqi democratization mission.

3. Baltic Military Cooperation

Unlike the Warsaw Pact countries, the Baltic states had no military establishment or diplomatic service of their own during the Cold War. These had to be built from scratch in the 1990s. This meant that Baltic officers and officials suffered from a lack of experience; on the other hand, the Baltic states did not have to reform cumbersome bureaucracies with entrenched interests. In line with the criteria for NATO membership, the Baltic states all increased their defense spending and pledged to maintain it at two percent of their gross domestic product. The continuing societal consensus on committing scarce resources to this area is a remarkable testament to the strong pull of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO has provided air-policing, which has been the single most visible and psychologically important security measure—especially since Russian military planes have continued to violate Baltic airspace, with a fighter jet even crashing on Lithuanian soil in 2005.

The prospect of NATO membership probably did more to promote Baltic cooperation than any other idea. The clear message from NATO was that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must practice cooperation in order to demonstrate their readiness and maturity for participation in the Atlantic alliance. Starting from the mid-1990s, the three have developed an impressive number of joint military projects: the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), to mention but the most significant. While these projects were all initially led by NATO or Nordic countries, after accession to NATO there has been an ongoing “baltification” of the projects, with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania taking responsibility for leading, staffing and funding the various projects.⁴

The very first project – the Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) – was established in 1994 but phased out in 2003.⁵ In the beginning of 2007, the ministers of defense of the three countries agreed to establish BALTBAT 2 – a joint Baltic lightly armed infantry and reconnaissance battalion for international missions, ready for the year 2010. According to plans, BALTBAT 2 will be mainly available for the planned NATO reaction force NRF-14. In BALTRON, the navies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each allocate one or two mine countermeasure vessels, and one additional ship performs the tasks of a command and support platform. The Baltic Naval Squadron was created to minimize mine hazards, enhance security in Baltic territorial waters and help to deal with environmental damage in the territorial waters and economic zones of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. BALTRON’s role is also to participate in international missions and exercises.

The Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) is establishing a Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre in Lithuania which would receive, process and display primary and secondary radar data in the three Baltic states, initiate tracking and identification of all aircraft in radar coverage and coordinate the exchange of regional information with third parties. The Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL), located in Tartu, Estonia, is the first combined institution for military education in the Baltic states, helping to create a common background for Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian officers. The college was established with the aim to quickly develop a qualified officer corps in the Baltic states capable of leading the future development

of the defense forces structures. The teaching staff of BALTDEFCOL currently includes representatives from twelve states (NATO member states as well as non-aligned countries with territorial defense traditions).

In addition to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian cooperation, Lithuania has also been looking southward, establishing joint initiatives with Poland. This is natural, as Lithuania and Poland have strong historical and cultural links and Poland as a large country can offer more than Latvia and Estonia can. Lithuanian-Polish cooperation has been extended in a few instances to tripartite projects involving Ukraine as well, for instance the Lithuanian-Polish common peacekeeping battalion LITPOLBAT was extended in 2005 to include Ukraine, becoming POLUKRLITBAT.⁶

4. Transatlanticism

For the Baltic states, maintaining the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community is of primary importance. Balts take it as axiomatic that only a strong transatlantic relationship can guarantee the security of the Baltic states and that weaknesses and divisions within the Euro-Atlantic community lessen Baltic security. While NATO and EU enlargement proceeded in parallel, there was no conflict of interest between supporting EU and U.S. policies. This began to change in the summer of 2002, when the Bush administration launched a campaign to secure bilateral agreements with partner countries that would exclude U.S. troops from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The EU strenuously objected, placing the Baltic countries in the undesirable position of potentially having to choose who their best friend is. The Baltic countries kept a low profile on the ICC bilateral accords and managed to resist American pressure by sheltering behind the EU position.

The Iraq war was the first big test that brought the tensions to the surface. In February 2003, the Eastern European NATO candidate countries signed a letter supporting the U.S. line on Iraq, angering French President Jacques Chirac, who admonished the Eastern Europeans that they missed “a good opportunity to keep quiet.” The attitude of the Baltic states was perhaps put across most forcefully when Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas, visiting the White House in September 2002, interrupted George W. Bush, saying, in effect, “you don’t have to tell us about what happens when democracies don’t stand up against dictators.”⁷

Clearly, the legacy of their history informed the Baltic understanding of the Iraq crisis. The Baltic states needed little convincing to join the American-led “coalition of the willing.” All three countries dispatched troops and specialists to both Afghanistan and Iraq to participate in the postwar security operations. Though their resources are meager, they have been extremely eager to prove themselves faithful friends to the dominant power of the Euro-Atlantic pole. As Kallas put it, the Balts have a moral obligation to help the United States when their assistance is called upon, because the United States has supported the Baltic states in the past. Or, as numerous Baltic ministers and officials have repeatedly stated in justifying their country’s participation in the Iraq mission, it is necessary to show that the Balts are not simply “security consumers,” but also contributors to global security.

Unconditional transatlanticism has suffered since then as a result of the Bush administration's misjudgment regarding Iraq. The general trend from 2005 onward was one of increasing skepticism toward unilateral U.S. actions. The Balts have begun to stress a more treaty-based approach, ready to support initiatives within the NATO framework but cautious about U.S. ad-hoc initiatives and coalitions.

5. Relations with Russia

After the restoration of independence, the relationship with Russia has remained cool. Russian politicians and officials have constantly attacked the Baltic states for alleged human rights violations of ethnic Russians who have not automatically been granted Estonian or Latvian citizenship. These charges have been refuted by international organizations such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that have constantly monitored the Estonian and Latvian governments' policies. The interpretation of recent history has also been the cause of intense debate, with the Baltic states seeking an acknowledgement from Russia that they had been illegally occupied by the USSR during World War II, while Russians counter with accusations of Baltic collaboration with Nazi Germany. The question of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad has been vitally important to Lithuania. It remains the most highly militarized territory in Europe. In 2002, Kaliningrad was the subject of intense negotiations between Russia and the EU. With the creation of "facilitated travel documents," a compromise was reached between the Russian desire for free movement of its citizens across Lithuanian territory and the EU's insistence on the integrity of the Schengen regime.

While it was widely anticipated that the Baltic states' accession to the EU and NATO would help normalize their relationship with Russia, this has not proven to be the case.⁸ It is evident that Russia has consciously been pursuing a strategy of driving a wedge between the old and new member states, appealing to the old member states to "teach" the Balts and the Poles in particular how to "maturely" deal with Russia.

A continuing area of contention between the Baltic states and Russia is the border treaties. Only Lithuania has managed to secure the ratification of its border treaty with Russia. However, this was made possible only because it was part of the package in resolving the EU-Russia dispute over visas and transit rights for Kaliningrad. Both Estonia and Latvia had initialed border treaties with Russia in the mid-1990s. However, Russia delayed its signature in the vain hope that it might prove an obstacle to Estonia's NATO and EU accession. Membership evidently occasioned a shift in the Kremlin's thinking, and the border treaty with Estonia was signed in May 2005.⁹

Yet after the Estonian parliament made reference to the continuity of Estonian statehood in its law of ratification, Russia withdrew its signature from the treaty. At present the treaty is in limbo, with little prospect for a break in the impasse. A treaty between Latvia and Russia was also on the verge of being signed around the same time, but Russia maintained that an interpretive declaration by the Latvian parliament opened the possibility of territorial claims. After this blow to the process, the Latvian parliament authorized the government in early 2007 to sign the treaty without making any

direct references to the continuity of Latvian statehood. The treaty was finally signed in Moscow on March 27. It now remains to be seen whether and when both sides manage to ratify it.

On this issue, the role of the EU has been ambiguous. On the one hand, Estonia and Latvia clearly felt the EU's support for their position by putting the treaty on the EU-Russia agenda, but on the other, after Russia withdrew its signature from the treaty with Estonia, EU support has certainly not been vocal. Though Estonian and Latvian politicians constantly referred to the question's European significance as the EU's external border, it was viewed from Brussels simply as an Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian "bilateral issue."

6. European Neighborhood Policy

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is seen as a suitable parallel capability for Baltic states in EU external affairs. Here national interests and capabilities coincide, as there is a need to support post-Soviet republics in their transition and integration processes. The Baltic states have the ability to assist these republics, and it is in their national interests to assist Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as efficiently as possible. All three Baltic ministers of foreign affairs have set the ENP as a top priority for their countries' foreign policies. The Baltic states are putting much greater efforts into strengthening ENP than ESDP, aware that the former can achieve far more in the areas of greatest importance for them.

For the EU-15, the Baltic states also represent necessary competences and resources for further integration processes related to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The older EU members lack the experience of practical political and social transition and also have an insufficient level of specialists able and willing to assist in target countries. The two most important target states for the Baltic states are Georgia and Moldova. Ukraine, also an important target country, usually demands more human and financial resources than the Baltic states are able to provide. Belarus mostly concerns Lithuanian interests, because of the common border. Lithuania has lobbied hard for an end to the EU policy of isolating Belarus and has tried instead to encourage active engagement with Belarusian civil society. The Baltic states mainly offer ENP countries border management support and civil servants' training. Know-how transfer is mainly aimed at younger midlevel civil servants working in EU or NATO areas. Financial support for neighborhood projects has doubled during the last two years. Further growth depends mainly on the target countries' ability to effectively use additional experts and donations.

Russia has also been extremely displeased at the role the Baltic states have had in strengthening the eastern dimension of the ENP. While the Baltic states have been eager to assist countries of the former Soviet Union by transferring their knowledge and experience of reforms and European integration, Moscow tends to view this activity in zero-sum-game geopolitical terms of weakening its influence over the states in question. The Russian government was particularly irked by the role of Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus along with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski in mediating a peaceful outcome after the electoral fraud in the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004.

7. Energy Security

On January 1, 2006, Russia temporarily turned off the supply of natural gas to Ukraine and a year later threatened to do the same to Belarus. For the Baltic states, concerns about energy security as a matter for common EU policy had already come to the fore in 2005, when Germany and Russia signed a deal to construct a pipeline (NordStream) beneath the Baltic Sea purposely bypassing the Baltic states and Poland.

Besides the questionable economic rationale and environmental risks, the main cause of indignation was the lack of consultation and the German government's lack of sensitivity to the vital interests of new EU member states. Historically, the Balts have good reason to be wary of Germans and Russians signing deals above their heads. In the wake of the new deal, the Balts have discovered the importance of EU solidarity. Baltic politicians suddenly began peppering their speeches with the hitherto rarely used term "solidarity." The Baltic states made the forging of a common European energy policy a priority in 2006. The major concern for the Baltic states is that they are isolated from European energy networks because they were part of the Soviet system and remain dependent on Russia. The Baltic Sea pipeline only serves to heighten their isolation – a fact that could have detrimental security implications.

Russia stopped supplying oil from its pipelines to the main facilities in Latvia (Ventspils) in 2003 and in Lithuania (Mazeikiai) in 2006, claiming that the pipeline needed repair. No target date has yet been given for reopening the pipeline. These actions make the Balts suspect political motives. Looking to become more self-sufficient in energy production, the state power companies of the three republics have undertaken a feasibility study for jointly constructing a new nuclear reactor at Ignalina, Lithuania, which would probably include Poland as well.

Moreover, recent developments such as the announced increase in Russian defense spending ominously hint at a possible remilitarization of the Baltic Sea region. In connection with the construction of the Baltic Sea pipeline, the Russian military has announced plans to build more vessels for the Baltic Sea fleet, particularly submarines, which supposedly will have a role in guarding the construction of the pipeline. An even more serious long-term threat for the Baltic Sea region as a whole is the Russian decision to reroute its oil exports from Belarus to the harbor of Primorsk. The planned massive increase in the volume of shipments to 150 million tons annually would turn the Gulf of Finland and the Straits of Denmark into a second Bosphorus.¹⁰

8. Participation in ESDP and NATO

Baltic strategies and participation in international defense and security organizations are overwhelmingly influenced by the historical lessons of World War II. They rest on the belief that independent territorial defense and even integrated Baltic defense forces cannot safeguard independence in case of possible aggression. Furthermore, membership in international organizations and non-aggression treaties are not considered sufficient for sustainable security. After the reestablishment of independence, Baltic security doctrines and defense strategy

represented purely realist thinking about international relations. Post-modern or institutional values faced strong resistance at both the ministerial and headquarters level. As Baltic threat perceptions in the 1990s were modern and realist, why would they need post-modern allies and obligations if the allies have nothing to offer for their security? The idea of the EU as a neoliberal “security community” was often also seen as only an excuse not to offer real guarantees or support. After accession to EU and NATO, ideas of soft security and international obligations have found their way into Baltic security thinking.

The main pillar of Baltic security is membership in multilateral defense alliances and active participation in safeguarding global security. In practical terms, the priority is to be ready to participate in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. This is seen as the best guarantee for possible security assistance if the Baltic states would need it in the future. Accordingly, the Baltic states participate in missions of the United Nations, NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the coalition forces in Iraq. The main selection criterion concerning missions is the priority of the transatlantic alliance and U.S. security needs. The EU is seen as important but still secondary as a security provider.¹¹ Capabilities are made available for other missions only when not needed by the United States and NATO. In 2007–2010, all three Baltic states plan to create additional capabilities for meeting the needs of other security providers besides NATO.

ESDP was also often seen as an unreasonable ambition, given that NATO already exists. Several headline goals and little practical progress also discouraged the Baltic states from putting their efforts into ESDP development. Furthermore, there were fears initially that ESDP could weaken or undermine NATO, the guarantor of Baltic security. Thus the most common mantra of Baltic defense officials was “no duplication” – that is, the EU should not create new structures where NATO ones already exist.

The cautious approach of the Balts toward ESDP is partly accounted for by the exclusion of Baltic interests and ideas in the forming of ESDP. The Baltic states were not EU members in 1999 when the ESDP was born; by 2004, when Baltic states joined the EU, the old member states had already formed their interests regarding ESDP, which were quite different from Baltic needs and capabilities. The introduction of the European Security Strategy in 2003 also did not cover all Baltic security interests and the Baltic understanding of mutual obligations in security provision. While fully understanding the need for mobile forces and the fight against terrorism, Balts would also add the need for energy security and cooperation in territorial defense issues. The approach that “traditional border lines and defense is history and not worth investment” was relevant inside the EU but hardly understandable in the Baltic area, where Russia has maintained pressure on the Baltic states and even increased it after accession. At the same time, the old member states have shown little interest in Baltic problems with Russia, viewing them as bilateral issues.

During the last fifteen years after independence and the coming five years, building up territorial defense was and will be sacrificed to make more resources available for NATO and EU mobile needs. This has led to a situation where Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have no fighter planes or tanks and only minimal air-defense and anti-tank systems to defend their territory. They are also

unable to provide host-nation support for possible NATO forces in their territory. However, special centers and training programs have been created for preparation of peacekeeping forces.

The Baltic states did not show interest in the first EU international missions and had, for example, no initiative to participate in Artemis, the first ESDP mission. One of the reasons for passivity was the lack of capabilities and skilled specialists for long-distance and hot-climate missions. During the 1990s, new personnel were trained and used at the same time (mainly in the Balkan area).

Starting in 1995, more than 6,000 Baltic soldiers have participated in peacekeeping missions under U.N., NATO or EU leadership. Participation began with the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission in Croatia and continued with missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2007, Estonia and Lithuania are more focused on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Latvia on the OIF mission in Iraq. The Baltic states have not taken on independent or tripartite missions, instead always participating jointly with other EU and NATO members. The first exception to this approach was Lithuania's decision to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT-4, Ghowr Province) in Afghanistan. The Balts' main partners have been the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, particularly Denmark.

In 2007, attention is paid chiefly to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the OIF mission in Iraq, the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the formation of NATO rapid-response forces (NRFs) and EU battlegroups. Participation in other operations is marginal. The rapid growth of participation of all Baltic states in external missions has been remarkable. For example, Lithuania's contribution has increased fivefold in three years – Lithuania had 60 men on missions in 2004, but already more than 300 men by the beginning of 2007.

The European Union Force Operation Althea (EUFOR-ALTHEA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the main ESDP field mission where the Baltic states participate. For the Baltic states, this was a long step forward in defense policy, as the earlier dominant thinking was that most forces must be kept available for possible NATO needs. The main challenge to participation in EUFOR-ALTHEA was finding additional resources, either by further professionalization of defense forces or additional training of paramilitary forces. In missions thus far, Baltic teams have mainly concentrated on explosive ordnance disposal, military observation, cross-service provisions, human intelligence, military police close protection, support elements and special operation forces. Concerning future ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the Baltic states are certainly willing to maintain the existing force presence. The political will exists to increase Baltic participation, but the major question will be the ability to recruit additional specialists to join Baltic defense forces.

9. Preparing for NRF and EU Battlegroup Capability

The Baltic states did not earmark any forces for the Helsinki Headline Goal, but they followed with interest the Anglo-Franco-German initiative of battlegroups. Initially the interest was mainly negative and mixed with hope that the concept would be abandoned or fictional and that EU states would prefer development of NATO Response Forces (NRFs). The Baltic states fervently

hoped to avoid potential competition between battlegroups and NRF concepts.

The Baltic states have offered their capabilities for both NATO Response Forces and EU battlegroups. In the NRF, the Baltic states are included in a rotation system offering mine clearing, medical assistance and infantry platoons. On the question of battlegroups, the Baltic states' positions have evolved positively during the past couple of years. During the buildup of the battlegroups, the Baltic states asked not to include their forces, but later they decided to join.

As in ISAF and OIF, the Baltic states do not form one group within EU's battlegroups. Instead, they joined different battlegroups. Estonia has joined the Nordic Battlegroup, which includes Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Ireland. The military strategic command of the force is provided in cooperation with the UK. The battlegroup should be available for the period January to July 2008. Estonia plans to contribute 45–50 troops. Latvia and Lithuania have chosen a different battlegroup, led by Germany and also including Poland and Slovakia.

Baltic interest at the launch of the battlegroups concept was lessened by the dependence on Russia and Ukraine for airlift capabilities, which could create a situation where potential missions close to the borders of Russia or Ukraine would be possible only with their approval. When leaving aside the Transdnestrian conflict, Georgian border problems, Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions, and other potential hotspots in the post-Soviet space because of the above-mentioned airlift dependence, the potential destinations include mainly the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa.

Both Middle Eastern and African target countries are important for the main contributors to the battlegroups, who have economic interests in the regions and the necessary military experience. The Baltic countries, however, have neither an economic or political interest in nor appropriate military equipment for missions in African or Middle Eastern states. But they do see the potential need for ESDP missions in Europe in the former Soviet space. The Balts are more willing to contribute to missions closer to home. Missions in Africa seem far away and incomprehensible to Balts. Having very little interaction with the African continent historically, they find it difficult to grasp the significance of their role. There is also very little contact on the ground. No Baltic embassies exist on the African continent, though all the Baltic states have plans to establish embassies, starting with Cairo. ESDP missions in Africa have often been viewed with suspicion as operations involving the interests of former colonial powers. With the need for the new member states to contribute to the EU's Development Cooperation assistance, interest in Africa will gradually rise. For now, however, Development Cooperation is focused on the countries of the former Soviet Union (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and Afghanistan. Estonia's military cooperation is more active within the framework of NATO and with Georgia and Ukraine and to a lesser extent with Western Balkans countries (Croatia, Macedonia, Albania).

The main problem for Baltic states inside battlegroups is the missing airlift ability and resupply ability. The problem is biggest in the Nordic Battlegroup, as other Nordic countries also lack strategic airlift ability as well as funds for its development.¹² Other goals of HG 2010, such as establishment of the European Defense Agency, creation of the European Aircraft Command,

improving forces compatibility and standardization, aroused little debate or interest in the Baltic states.

But when the Baltic states evaluate the pros and cons of ESDP, they still end up with a long list of obligations and costs on one side and a dearth of resource assistance and needed political support in relations with Russia on the other. Accordingly, they maintain that ESDP and European Security Strategy can no longer reflect only the interest of core Europe while asking all the member states to contribute; it needs a number of adjustments to take into account the interests of new member states as well.

The need for rapid deployment of forces in peace-support missions in distant places has increased the pressure for the transformation of European armies. The Baltic states, which initially employed concepts based on territorial defense, have now turned to integrating the benefits of cooperative and collective defense offered by EU and NATO into their defense systems. Only Latvia has gone as far as to create a purely volunteer professional army. The Lithuanians are considering moving gradually in that direction. The strongest resistance to this idea has been in Estonia, where it has been a source of tension between military headquarters and the ministry of defense and occasioned heated public debate during the March 2007 parliamentary election campaign. No similar institutional rivalry exists between the Baltic ministries of defense and ministries of foreign affairs. All are strongly supportive of NATO and view ESDP as a secondary alternative that must be kept open alongside NATO.

The Baltic states continue to follow the doctrine that NATO already has enough capabilities for territorial defense but needs additional resources for mobile international missions against asymmetrical threats. To meet international needs, Baltic states are building up new mobile capabilities. By the year 2010, they plan to double their amount of mobile units. The Baltic states will continue to keep their special capabilities: mine clearing, border control, naval mine clearing and medical support. This positive plan can face several threats. First, Baltic defense ministers have in the past introduced overly optimistic plans to increase the number of mobile units, but the unattractiveness of the defense forces meant a lack of human resources to implement those plans. Second, in 2006–2007, a period of rapid economic growth and the lowest unemployment rate ever, Baltic defense forces are losing professionals to private-sector companies and at the same time having great difficulty recruiting new specialists. The rapidly growing number of missions poses a challenge for Baltic capacities. Baltic resources, particularly human resources, are clearly overstretched. One manifestation of this was that the Balts did not contribute militarily to the Lebanon mission in 2006.

Conclusion

After using their military capacity mainly within NATO, the Baltic states have little left for ESDP missions. However, this does not mean that they are negatively inclined toward ESDP. It is clear that there is a growing trend toward more positive attitudes and more proactive engagement

with ESDP in the Baltic states. Part of the problem has been the lack of suitable EU missions. Therefore, the Balts have concentrated on the battlegroups. The Baltic states are working simultaneously along several lines to add more to ESDP. The creation of a new mobile joint battalion, the increase in the budgetary resources allocated for civilian assistance, and participation in battlegroups are just some of the initial signs. The Baltic states have also compensated for their limited military capabilities with greater interest in assistance to ENP target countries, where they can play an important role in conflict prevention and the construction of sustainable peace.

Nevertheless, it remains obvious that these small states cannot take part in every ESDP mission and activity. Thus they will continue to focus on developing niche abilities such as mine clearing, medical support and border management. Furthermore, the Baltic states understandably tend to concentrate their attention on the geographical areas where they have the most experience and necessary competence, primarily the former Soviet Union and other previously communist-ruled countries.

Baltic participation in ESDP could accelerate and be more useful if the old member states would better appreciate that the Baltic states do not have the same 50-year experience of peace and prosperity as Western Europe and still need time to overcome traditional threats from Russia. While the Baltic states try more and more to understand and follow ESDP values, the next step for fruitful cooperation could be that old member states act to make the next European Security Strategy more closely reflect Baltic interests. When that happens, a common security strategy will also be common in practice.

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Denmark and ESDP

Gorm Rye Olsen

As a member of the European Union (EU), Denmark participates fully in European collaboration on foreign and security policy. In the years following 1993 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, there is no doubt that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has become an essential component and integral part of Denmark's foreign policy. This is obvious from Danish participation in the debates on European foreign policy and from attempts to coordinate foreign policy initiatives among the member states.¹

Moreover, Danish civil servants participate in all working groups in Brussels dealing with the CFSP, including all groups dealing with defense issues except the one dealing with the European Defense Agency. In the Political and Security Committee, the official who represents Denmark has the rank of ambassador. It seems to be a guiding principle for the civil servants involved in all working groups that they endeavor to play a positive and constructive role in the debates on all issues on the table. Also, the Danish civil servants make an effort to contribute constructively in the preparatory phase before topics are officially tabled.²

In spite of the still closer cooperation within the European Union on foreign policy and security issues, Denmark has an opt-out from the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This opt-out was granted at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992. The central formulation in the Edinburgh treaty reads like this: "The heads of state and heads of government take note...(that)...Denmark cannot participate in the preparation and the implementation of decisions and actions within the Union which affect the defense area, but Denmark will not hinder that closer cooperation between the member states in this field takes place."³ The other member countries accepted that Denmark needed a legally binding arrangement in order to ratify the Maastricht Protocol. In return, Denmark had to promise not to obstruct any further developments, should the other countries wish to deepen their collaboration in, for example, the field of defense policy.⁴

It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the circumstances that can explain the special Danish dilemma between a positive stance toward European cooperation on foreign and security policy, on the one hand, and a very strict opt-out on defense cooperation within the EU, on the other. The next section describes the opt-out, and the following section scrutinizes its consequences. After these introductory chapters, the paper raises the question whether administrative impediments are the reason for not lifting the opt-out. The answer is quite clearly No. It is followed by a similar question, namely whether lack of capacity of the Danish armed forces can explain the situation. In that instance as well, the answer is No. Is public opinion against Danish participation in the ESDP? Even though it can be argued that opinion is not unambiguously in favor of lifting the opt-out, a majority of the voters are positive toward Danish participation in defense.

Based on the separate analyses, it is difficult to give a convincing answer to why the government

has not decided to lift the opt-out on defense. However, an answer might be found in Danish identity and popular attitudes toward the European integration project in general. These issues are discussed in the last section of the paper. Even though Danish identity can produce an answer, it does not suffice to explain why Denmark still does not participate in the ESDP. In the concluding section, it is therefore argued that the basic reason the government has not decided to lift the opt-out must lie in the particular parliamentary situation that has existed since November 2001, when Denmark got a new liberal-conservative government.

1. The Opt-out on Defense

The opt-out on defense was granted in the Edinburgh agreement as part of a larger package including three other opt-outs from specific policy areas. The Danish government's request for these opt-outs stemmed from the results of a June 1992 referendum held in the wake of its acceptance of the conditions for joining the European Union. The majority of No votes in the referendum came despite overwhelming political support in the Danish Parliament for EU membership, including the provision for cooperation on defense issues. In May 1992, a comfortable majority of 130 of 179 members of the Danish Parliament voted in favor of ratifying the Treaty on the European Union, with just 25 votes against. The result was a clear recommendation to voters to assent to Danish membership in the European Union at the referendum on June 2, 1992.⁵

The referendum attracted great popular interest and the turnout reached 82.3 percent. A very small majority – just 50.7 percent – voted against Danish membership in the Union, while the proponents mustered 49.3 percent of the votes.⁶ The Danish politicians were forced to find a special arrangement for Denmark in areas where Danish voters had problems with the new treaty. At the 1992 Edinburgh summit, the other countries accepted that Denmark needed a legally binding arrangement in order to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.

On June 18, 1993, in a second referendum on the Union Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement, 56.7 percent voted Yes while 43.3 percent voted against the new arrangement.⁷ This cleared the road for Denmark to join the European Union. In relation to the passing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Danish opt-outs were simply included in the Danish protocol to the Treaty. They existed, as it was formulated, “before, during and after” the conference leading to Amsterdam.⁸

From the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty on November 1, 1993, and up to January 1, 2003, Denmark activated its opt-out on defense cooperation nine times. On each occasion, it was in relation to decisions belonging to the soft end of the Petersberg tasks.⁹ Specifically, the opt-out was activated in relation to planning for the evacuation of EU civilians from conflict zones, as well as in relation to joint actions on personnel mines and on contributions of police forces in Albania and EU assistance for mine clearing in Croatia. Ironically, “they were all missions which Denmark would usually have participated in if only it had not been within the framework of the EU. However, the practical significance was less important than the symbolic.”¹⁰

2. The Danish Opt-out and the Development of ESDP

There is no doubt that the opt-out in itself is a very important factor putting strict limitations to Danish participation in defense cooperation within the Union. Generally, successive Danish governments have interpreted the opt-out in a rather permissive way, allowing Denmark to participate in the debates in the Council of Ministers on motions for decisions and actions with implications for the defense area. In relation to discussions on strengthening the European defense dimension, the government has referred to the argument that in principle, only the adoption of formal legal documents affecting the defense area falls within the opt-out. Among other things, the government has participated in discussions and has endorsed public statements within this field.¹¹ Also, Danish officials participate in the three military committees implementing the ESDP.

However, in the run-up to the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 and at the Lisbon Council in March 2000, the government chose to refer to the opt-out. By doing so, the government wanted to signal that the implementation of these decisions could be anticipated to affect the opt-out. At the October 2000 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, where a number of countries both within and outside the EU committed forces to the coming EU rapid reaction force, Danish Defense Minister Hans Hækkerup participated without promising troops to the force. Denmark could participate in the general planning of the ESDP, but the country had to abstain from participating in concrete implementation at the operational level.¹²

Above, it was mentioned that until 2003, the Danish opt-out on defense mainly seems to have had symbolic significance while the practical implications were limited. With the still stronger EU involvement in military crisis management operations from early 2003, the Danish opt-out created a new situation. The opt-out began to have political consequences for Denmark's influence possibilities in the European Union. Of course, the consequences were most strongly felt within the defense area.¹³

The first decision that exposed the Danish political dilemma came on March 31, 2003, when the EU launched its first military mission ever. Code-named Concordia, it took place in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The EU troops took over the tasks from NATO, which had had responsibility for observing the Ohrid Agreement. Because of the opt-out, Denmark had to pull its troops from FYROM when the EU took over the peace-support operation. It is worth noting that the operation had been acceptable to Denmark as long as it took place under the aegis of NATO. Operation Concordia ended on December 15, 2003, and was followed by an EU police mission deploying 200 policemen. Because it was now a civilian operation, Denmark could again participate, contributing six Danish police officers.

The next EU decision within the ESDP framework came on July 12, 2003, when the Council of Ministers adopted a groundbreaking resolution. For the first time ever, the Council decided to deploy a purely EU military force in a crisis management operation outside Europe, which it did in accordance with a clear United Nations (U.N.) mandate. The aim of this particular operation was to stabilize the security situation in the crisis-ridden Ituri province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and thereby improve the humanitarian situation in and around the main town,

Bunia. The Ituri operation falls clearly within the framework of the existing Danish policy for peace-support operations and also within the framework of the declared policy on supporting the United Nations in situations like the one in DRC.

The latest EU peacekeeping operation, and the most significant for Denmark's international reputation, was launched in December 2004 when the European Union deployed 7,000 soldiers in Bosnia. Denmark had withdrawn its soldiers under NATO command long before, when it became known that the EU was going to take over the NATO mission there.¹⁴ The EU assumed the tasks of NATO in Bosnia based on a resolution unanimously approved in the United Nations Security Council. Resolution No. 1551 of June 9, 2004, expressed a very positive attitude toward the EU's intentions to engage militarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The military operation of EUFOR was carried out by means of support from NATO and in agreement with the Berlin Plus Deal. Even though the EU had formal command, there was a clear agreement that the EU and NATO would cooperate closely after the EU assumed responsibility for the peacekeeping tasks. The EU and NATO made an agreement about mutual use of tactical reserves, which could be used both by EUFOR and by NATO in its operation in Kosovo (KFOR). The opt-out from defense cooperation within the EU meant that Denmark had to make clear from the start that Danish armed forces deployed in the NATO operation in Kosovo could not be placed under EU command. Therefore, they could not be used as reinforcement of EUFOR should a crisis situation occur in Bosnia.¹⁵

Reservations over the question of the possible reinforcement by KFOR troops in Bosnia may be the first tangible issue where it is possible to indicate that the opt-out has consequences for the country's international influence capabilities. Thus, the official evaluation of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁶ clearly suggests that these reservations make Denmark a less interesting partner for other countries, not only within the EU but also for NATO and non-EU members. "Other countries know that Danish contributions cannot be discussed when dealing with EU operations and Denmark therefore becomes a less interesting partner. A concrete example has already been observed: Denmark had offered to become the 'lead nation' on a project concerning air transport capacity under the aegis of NATO. A number of other countries had shown interest and were positive toward the Danish solution. However Denmark had to withdraw its offer because a number of countries insisted that the capacities had to be available to both NATO and to the EU."¹⁷

Summing up, the Danish opt-out from defense cooperation within the European Union increasingly creates political problems for Denmark as far as the aim of being a credible partner is concerned. Also, it is a problem for the overall aims of Danish foreign policy, namely to contribute to promoting peace and stability globally. The situation is recognized by central government representatives including the Prime Minister himself. Nevertheless, no concrete steps are taken to change this situation. In order to answer the question why nothing is done politically to change this situation, a number of issues have to be addressed. The first task is to scrutinize whether it is possible to identify administrative obstacles to this situation. Secondly, the paper addresses the question whether the Danish defense forces lack the military capacity to join and to participate in EU-led operations. Thirdly, the paper looks into the question of public opinion as a possible obstacle to calling a referendum and thereby lifting the opt-out.

3. Administrative Adaptations without Political Adaptation

Are the administrative structure and the general decision-making setup in the Danish civil service a possible explanation for the country's nonparticipation in the ESDP? In this context, the two most relevant ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. As a start, it is striking how significant bureaucratic adaptations have taken place in both ministries during the past 10 years or so.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the 2006 Ministerial Directory reveals that the European Union takes up a lot of time, attention and manpower in the so-called North Division of the Ministry. The Directory shows that most of the sections are involved in policy-making on EU issues. Thus, of the six sections in the North Division, one is named European Politics, another is called EU Coordination, a third Foreign Policy with a subtitle referring to the EU member countries. A fourth section deals with Security Policy with a subtitle referring explicitly to European security.¹⁸ In the section on security politics, a number of civil servants work full time with topics related to the ESDP.¹⁹ Thus, there is no doubt that the internal organization of the MFA has adapted to the developments of the CFSP, including, most strikingly, the developments of the ESDP – in spite of the opt-out.

Within the realm of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), a more or less similar picture can be observed. The division on Strategy and Policy has two subsections, one dealing with NATO and the EU and another involved in Security Cooperation and International Law. In relation to the division's specific use of staff, it is interesting to note that the MoD has allocated as much manpower to manage Denmark's relationship to the ESDP as to manage Danish interests in relation to NATO's defense planning.²⁰ The lack of Danish participation in the ESDP and the lack of Danish contributions to the EU's military operations do not, however, keep MoD officials from participating in debates on these issues. As in the MFA, MoD officials deliberately maintain a low profile in the different working groups, always with a close eye on the limitations that follow from the opt-out.

Based on these observations, it seems safe to conclude that as of early 2007, the national institutional structure and the policy-making processes within the realm of the MFA and the MoD are to a very large extent adapted to what goes on at the European level concerning the ESDP. Moreover, based on a number of interviews with civil servants and personal observations made in the two ministries, it is possible to state that participation in meetings and negotiations on European defense and security issues seems to have had a strong socializing effect on Danish civil servants. It is possible to identify a very outspoken frustration among these civil servants that Denmark does not participate fully in the development of the ESDP, including in its implementation. The frustration seems to spring from a widespread perception that Danish foreign and security policy is most adequately formulated and implemented in close collaboration with partners in the EU. It apparently has strong roots in personal perceptions and personal experience among the Danish civil servants that other member states find them less interesting partners when it comes to narrow defense issues.

Summing up, the institutional setup and related decision-making processes in the two most relevant ministries have clearly adapted to the developments of the CFSP and the ESDP. Moreover, the institutional adaptations also reflect the increasing significance of the European Union in the overall picture of Danish foreign and security policy. Civil servants seem to have a very positive attitude toward the ESDP and, in particular, a strong wish to have Denmark participate in the development of a common European defense. Therefore, these civil servants would very much like to see the opt-out on European defense lifted. In conclusion, neither the institutional setup nor the attitudes of the involved civil servants can explain the lack of Danish participation in the ESDP.

4. The Danish Defense Forces: Capable of Joining ESDP?

Since the end of the Cold War, Danish foreign policy and Danish security and defense policies have been characterized by two significant developments. On the one hand, there has been a marked readiness to use the armed forces by deploying Danish soldiers in crisis areas.²¹ Parallel to the increased willingness to commit Danish military forces, Danish foreign policy has also become even more multilateral. The two trends clearly manifested themselves in Denmark's active participation in both traditional U.N. operations and NATO military operations in the former Yugoslavia. Within the framework of the United Nations, Denmark took the initiative to establish a rapid multilateral reaction force called SHIRBRIG, which came into action with the participation of Danish troops for the first time in connection with a UN-monitored ceasefire between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa in 2000.

The conspicuous determination to use Danish soldiers in military operations abroad has led researchers to argue that during the 1990s, Denmark's international role evolved from being a "civilian actor" to being a "strategic actor" in the current century.²² Denmark was a civilian actor because of its position as a third party between two warring parties, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example. With active Danish participation in the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan starting in October 2001, it is more appropriate to describe Denmark as a strategic actor.²³ Similarly, there is no doubt that Denmark acted as a strategic actor in relation to the U.S.-led attack on Iraq on March 19, 2003, when the country provided troops for direct combat actions just as it did in Afghanistan.

Thus, Denmark and the Danish armed forces have been willing to participate with troops in a number of instances – as long as these operations took place under the aegis of either the United Nations or NATO. The political willingness to continue to commit troops was underlined with the new defense agreement covering 2005 to 2009. The agreement reached in Parliament foresees that Denmark in the future will be able, on a permanent basis, to have around 2,000 troops deployed abroad in international missions. Therefore, Denmark has also joined and signed up troops for NATO Response Forces intended for a whole range of missions ranging from combat actions to peacekeeping. So there is no doubt that Danish politicians have considerable ambitions for Denmark to command stronger and much more internationally oriented armed forces. This was clearly and publicly stated as late as November 1, 2006, in a public speech at the Danish Defense Academy.²⁴

Summing up, the Danish armed forces already have a considerable capacity to participate in military operations abroad, which is expected to be expanded and developed further toward 2009. Moreover, there is considerable political agreement and thus political backing to have Danish soldiers participate in international operations that might be under NATO command, under U.N. command or even in “coalitions of the willing” as was the case in Iraq. The fact that Danish troops can participate in a NATO Response Force clearly underscores that they would have no problem joining an EU battlegroup. In conclusion, the capacity of the Danish defense forces in no way represents an obstacle to participation in the ESDP. To the contrary, the Danish military is very well developed, trained and experienced in the type of operations covered by the ESDP. Moreover, there is strong political backing for Danish defense forces playing roles that fall within the framework of the ESDP. It is only the opt-out that prevents the armed forces from participating in ESDP missions.

5. Public Opinion and European Defense Cooperation

Can public opinion or, more concretely, negative public opinion about Danish participation in the ESDP explain why the government hesitates to call a referendum in pursuit of a mandate to lift the defense opt-out? It is important to emphasize that public opinion is particularly important in the Danish case when it comes to making a decision on lifting the opt-out on defense cooperation in the EU. The simple reason is that Danish politicians have committed themselves to holding such a referendum to underpin the decision.

In 2001, a thorough opinion survey on European attitudes toward European defense showed that 78 percent of Danes viewed the creation of a rapid reaction force as a “good thing,” while at the same time only 27 percent of Danes were in favor of common EU decisions on defense.²⁵ On the other hand, Eurobarometer surveys quite consistently point to an, over time, increasingly positive attitude toward common EU defense. The survey from late 2005 indicates that no less than 60 percent of Danes are in favor of a common foreign policy and that as much as 69 percent of Danes support a common EU defense policy,²⁶ up from 66 percent in 2004.²⁷ In the 2003 survey, it also appears that more and more people accept that decisions on foreign policy and on defense policy have to be taken jointly with the other EU member states.²⁸ A second set of data covering most individual months in 2005 and January 2006 confirms the 2005 Eurobarometer figures. In the monthly 2005–06 survey, a steady majority, around 55 percent of the Danish electorate, indicated that they would vote in favor of lifting the opt-out on defense cooperation within the EU.²⁹

The opinion figures raise two questions. First, why has public opinion apparently shifted toward acceptance of Danish participation in the ESDP? There are no research-based explanations. One hypothesis is that the ESDP has developed in a way that the Danish public did not foresee in 1992. A core fear of many Danes in 1992 was that European cooperation on defense issues would lead to the establishment of a European army. Obviously, this has not happened. Moreover, it is possible to interpret the opinion figures as pointing toward a growing recognition among Danish voters that cooperation on defense issues, not least within the European Union, is imperative in the current international situation.

Second, it is an open question whether the survey figures are stable – and so stable as to give politicians a reliable indication that they will get a positive vote in a future referendum. Existing research on Danish public opinion emphasizes that political attitudes tend to remain stable over time.³⁰ On the other hand, during the hectic weeks and months of campaigning in advance of a referendum, fairly stable attitudes may change quite dramatically. This was the case during the 2000 campaign on lifting the opt-out for Danish participation in the EMU, which resulted in a No vote of 54 percent.

This particular experience suggests that politicization of an issue during a referendum campaign may lead to rather unforeseen results. It also suggests that a campaign focusing specifically on the EU, and implying a politicization of Denmark's relationship to the European Union in itself, may change attitudes significantly and tip the balance from a majority of voters in favor to a majority opposed.³¹ The latter observation raised the crucial question of whether certain deep structures exist within the Danish population that can be called upon during heated political debates related to the future of the nation-state Denmark. This particular issue will be addressed in the following section.

6. Danish Identity and Denmark's Relationship to the European Project

It can be argued that the defense issue represents a crucial component in the Danish national identity because exactly that – defense – is a core responsibility of a nation-state. Moreover, defense cooperation within the European Union touches upon the crux of the dilemma facing the Danish public in relation to the European integration process. The close link that exists in Denmark between core concepts like nation, state and people puts some decisive limitations on the character of the European projects and European visions that can be launched in the Danish debate.³² More precisely, the close link among the three concepts implies that the Danish debate on the European integration process has taken place within the framework of the state. Irrespective of political position, the debate has built on an implicit model of the current and future EU, which is the nation-state.

The special constellation state-nation-people has had two significant consequences for the Danish debate on Europe. First, the close link between state and nation implies that possible threats to the political sovereignty of Denmark are not "only" aimed at the state. Often such perceived threats are widened to include the national and the cultural identity of the Danes. Secondly, the domestic conceptualization of the Danish state as a highly developed welfare state has meant that a number of initiatives from the EU have been interpreted as threats to the state.³³ The groups and parties campaigning against the Maastricht Treaty were able to present the Union treaty as a slide toward more integration, meaning the establishment of a "federalist superstate" project.³⁴

Specifically, the issues of the common defense policy in the Maastricht Treaty prompted the launching of arguments that the ESDP would lead to something very un-Danish, namely power politics: "Is the European Union planning to become a European gendarme?" it was asked. The

assertion was heard that “No Danish sons must be forced into serving in a common European army.” The Euro-skeptic debate focused very much on the establishment of a “European army” that would give the European Union an independent and integrated military identity of its own.

In summary, it can be argued that precisely the Edinburgh opt-out from the ESDP was particularly important for containing this fear of a superstate. And as such it was a very crucial reason why the second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty achieved a comfortable Yes. “The Edinburgh Treaty can be read as an attempt to ward off the fear that Denmark participated in a European state-building project. Although the four opt-outs are in fields with significant symbolic significance for a state-building project, the proponents of European integration continuously tried to convince the voters that the EU was not in the course of developing into a new state.”³⁵

7. The Official Government Position

This section will briefly show that the official position of the current government is clear and strong, namely that the opt-out on defense within the European Union should be lifted, the sooner the better. For example, it is worth noting that EU involvement in the FYROM in March 2003 was supported strongly by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In a public speech, he stressed that it was in the interest of Denmark that the EU develop its military capacity to carry out peace-enforcement operations and humanitarian tasks in Europe, for example in the Western Balkans.³⁶

On several occasions, the Minister of Defense, Søren Gade, has stated directly that the opt-out isolates Denmark internationally. “Currently, we see a rapid development of the EU’s capabilities to carry out crisis management operations. It is unfortunate that the defense opt-out prohibits us from influencing this development ... it is increasingly obvious that the defense opt-out is not in Denmark’s interest.”³⁷ Gade has also emphasized that the defense opt-out has “concrete, negative consequences for Denmark... The Danish defense opt-out will more and more often put obstacles in the way for Denmark as the European defense cooperation intensifies. It is not in the interest of Denmark and it is in opposition to Denmark’s wish to contribute to peace, stability and democracy.”³⁸

Just before Denmark took over the seat in the U.N. Security Council (2005–2006), the minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, clearly expressed the Danish dilemma in a public speech, stating “concretely, the opt-out prohibits us from participating in a number of areas where the EU takes responsibility for meeting the new challenges which are ours too: To create peace and security in our near abroad. To fight border crossing crime and terrorism.”³⁹

In late 2006, Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen emphasized that “it is important that the EU becomes a global actor....This is exactly why we strive to improve the capacity of the EU to lift its global responsibility. It is annoying that we are not part of the defense dimension which develops so fast these years....The Parliament can deploy Danish soldiers in operations under NATO or U.N. command, but not if they are under EU command. It is absurd....It weakens Denmark

internationally....I have to say as long as there is uncertainty as to the future of the Constitutional Treaty, it is very difficult to ask the Danes to vote on the defense opt-out in a referendum. It is my firm conclusion that the defense opt-out should be lifted as soon as it is possible.”⁴⁰

8. What Does It Take to Make Denmark More Committed to ESDP?

Now, it is time to raise the question: What does it take to make Denmark more committed to the ESDP? Or more precisely: What does it take for Denmark to lift the opt-out regarding participation in defense cooperation in the European Union? First of all, it is obvious the government has to decide to have a referendum on the issue. Until now, the government has maintained that there will not be any referendum on the defense opt-out or any of the other opt-outs Denmark was granted at the 1992 Edinburgh summit until a solution is found to the question of the Constitutional Treaty.

Nevertheless, it is still pertinent to ask why the government – confronted with a fairly positive public opinion and, moreover, confronted with increasing political problems vis-à-vis our partners in the European Union – has not announced a referendum on the defense opt-out. The latter development is most clearly illustrated by the incoherent policy on reinforcement issues in Bosnia. It has been mentioned that this case in particular damaged Denmark’s credibility as a partner in military operations with other partners, European NATO partners or not. On numerous occasions, prominent ministers such as the prime minister and the defense minister have openly claimed that the opt-out harms Danish interests and therefore ought to be lifted as soon as possible. Basically, it is difficult to explain why the government has not called a referendum on the defense opt-out, which has been described as absurd by the prime minister himself. It has been shown that neither administrative obstacles nor military capacity problems stand in the way.

Therefore, the remaining part of the paper is to some extent qualified guesswork. Based on the above analysis, it is possible to emphasize the special linkage of state-nation-people that is claimed to be crucial and of special significance for Danish national identity. The referendum campaign on lifting the EMU opt-out in 2000 can give basis for claiming that a renewed debate on, and thus focus on, such a sensitive policy field as defense within the EU might change the fairly positive opinion into a more skeptical one, resulting in a defeat for the government. The probability for a No may be particularly obvious because defense is so crucial to Danish national identity.

If this is not a totally convincing explanation, one has to point to the special parliamentary situation that has characterized Denmark since the fall of 2001, when the country got a new liberal-conservative government. The government is technically a minority government that bases its policy on support from a right-wing party, the Danish People’s Party (DPP), which is characteristically quite skeptical toward more integration within the European Union. There is no doubt that the DPP would launch a very aggressive campaign in case of a referendum on the defense opt-out. The campaign would to a very large extent appeal to the special nation-state-people

linkage so central to Danish identity and self-understanding.

But still, the government could take the chance and hope that it would not face a situation similar to the EMU referendum of 2000. One reason why it does not do so is that there might exist a tacit understanding between the government and the DPP that launching a referendum would harm the relationship between the two that holds the key to the government's survival. In this interpretation, the government finds it comfortable to have the option of pointing to the unresolved situation related to the Constitutional Treaty and thereby postponing a potential confrontation with the DPP on the opt-out issue.

In conclusion, it is narrow political and parliamentary circumstances that can explain why the government does not move to lift the defense opt-out. Basically, it is not possible to find other convincing explanations. Therefore, it is quite certain that there will be not be a Danish referendum on defense issues until the situation concerning the Constitutional Treaty is solved.

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Finland and ESDP

Hanna Ojanen

Finland has consistently favored the development of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and can be considered an active participant in terms of the degree to which it implements ESDP decisions, but also in terms of its own input into establishing and further developing the common policies. Put simply, Finland has an interest in a European Union (EU) that is a strong actor in international relations and that thus strengthens the position of its member countries, in particular that of the smaller ones. Finland considers the unity and cohesion of the Union in this field an important prerequisite of strength. Conversely, splits in security and defense policies among the member states cause problems for Finland, which would prefer not to take a stand in favor of one view and opposing another. Finland's activism across the spectrum of today's ESDP has a reverse side in the strong belief in reciprocity: By supporting the others and the common good, Finland counts on being supported by the EU and the other member states when needed.

Finland's commitment to the ESDP is not limitless, though: In addition to material or financial limitations, there are some limits of a more abstract character. The clearest of these limits seems to pertain to common defense, something that has been difficult for Finland to commit to. Yet the reasons for this reluctance lie in calculations relating to with the credibility of the EU as a defense political actor rather than in a strong domestic doctrine of military non-alignment. The characterizations of the Finnish Minister of Defense Seppo Kääriäinen¹ reiterate these points. In his view, the European Union's achievements in the international domain are valuable and strengthen the credibility of ESDP in the eyes of the media and the public. They also create great expectations for the Union. He would underline that in the relation between people and the EU, the key word is confidence; the EU policy must give added value to each country's national policy, especially in security matters.²

1. Central Factors Explaining the Finnish Position

Among the main factors that play a role in shaping Finland's position on the ESDP are the role and understanding of security policy in Finland, Finnish EU policies in general terms, Finnish military doctrine, the role of government, parties and parliament, public opinion, and geography.³

1.1 The Centrality of Security Policy

Security policy plays a peculiar role in Finland. For a long time, this was a field where debate was discouraged. Linked to the survival of the country, it was too important to be contested openly. Referring to security considerations still carries a specific weight. Even the EU has been seen from a security policy standpoint. It is often said that Finland joined the EU for reasons of security.

Former president of the Republic Mauno Koivisto argued in his memoirs in 1995 that in comparison to security, economic arguments for membership were only of secondary importance. This might be a post hoc rationalization. It would seem that Finland did not join in order to enhance its security but rather because it felt safe enough to do so, or because joining no longer affected its security in a negative way: Joining the EU no longer was politically controversial or compromising to security.

The reason for emphasizing the security dimension of the EU was linked to the referendum on EU membership. The political elite took up the positive influence of the EU on Finnish security at the final stage of pre-referendum campaigns. Security came to play a role as an important, if not decisive, argument in favor of membership in a situation where other arguments were not convincing enough. It was, for instance, difficult to say what the exact economic impact of membership would be.

The government then came to adopt the stand that the EU indeed was a security community where solidarity among the members strengthens the security of each. Actually, it went as far as to note in 1995 that “Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure.”⁴ Thus, in the Finnish interpretation, the EU came to have clear security implications, even military implications. This may have been much more than what was generally acknowledged within the EU, where the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was at the time very new. Not many believed in a real development toward a common security and defense policy. In Finnish official documents, it was soon confirmed that membership had indeed strengthened Finnish security.

The basic mechanism behind this lay in reciprocity. A member state supportive of the others would also receive support. As the 1995 Defense White Paper put it, “[B]y sharing in these collective efforts, Finland can expect support from other members for its own aspirations and for its position.”⁵ When solidarity later on became a key word within the EU through the solidarity clause, it would have been very difficult for Finland not to support the concept wholeheartedly, as it had been so strongly called for by the Finns.

Part of the argument that EU membership strengthens Finnish security is compatibility between Finnish foreign and security policy and that of the EU. First, this took the form of compatibility between military non-alignment and membership. Perhaps paradoxically, a central proof of this compatibility was the view held in Finland – as in most EU countries – that common defense was not on the agenda, and even if it did one day make its way onto the agenda, it would still remain in the realm of unanimous decision-making and veto right. Secondly, compatibility was demonstrated through an interpretation of the CFSP that underlined its similarity with Finnish thinking. The goals and values behind the Union’s policies were found identical with the Finnish ones: peace, security and the promotion of human rights. Thus, the two would be pursuing the same interests. It was also pointed out that the CFSP did not imply a need to alter bilateral relations with neighbors.

Finland emphasized that it joined the EU as a militarily non-aligned country whose credible independent defense capability is an important contribution to the Union's common security.⁶ It would actively and constructively participate in common policies and specified that military non-alignment does not imply restrictions as to its participation in European cooperation. Such a declaration was spurred by suspicions on the part of some EU member countries and the Commission about whether Finland as a militarily non-aligned country would really be able and willing to fulfill all the requirements linked to the eventual development of a common defense policy.

In the field of what was to become ESDP, Finland came to be a central player together with Sweden in the IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty. It was these countries that proposed a compromise between full merger of the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) and no merger at all, in the form of letting the EU take over the crisis management or "Petersberg" tasks. This was a defensive move on their part – they wanted to keep common defense out of the EU – but it was a defense that could also be interpreted as constructive participation. The two countries' active involvement in setting the scene led later on to the need also to be generous in terms of their own contributions to the EU's developing crisis management capabilities.

1.2 Finnish EU Policies

Finland's activism in CFSP/ESDP must also be placed in a broader political context. In the early years of Finnish EU membership, the pursuit of a place in the "core" of the Union was visible across the field. The Finnish government was consciously trying to move from the periphery to the core in order to maximize its political influence,⁷ including in security policy. The Finnish emphasis on efficiency also led to open-mindedness toward qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy even in matters other than implementation, and even toward the application of flexibility or enhanced cooperation in security and defense policy cooperation.⁸

However, clashes between small and large member states, but also the new steps forward in the ESDP, contributed to a certain policy reorientation from "pro-" to "anti-core." This became visible during 2003 in the Finnish statements. From that point onward, the emphasis was on the need to keep the Union together.

1.3 National Defense Doctrine and Views on Common Defense

The Finnish defense doctrine is based on the centrality of territorial defense by national means. The threat scenarios used in defense planning include a strategic strike or a military attack aimed at seizing territory, in addition to regional crises with potential implications for Finland and political, economic or military pressure which may include a threat of using military force and its restricted use.⁹

In a country for which defense is national and the threats are territorial, the discussions on the need to incorporate common defense policy and common defense in the EU treaties have evidently caused debate. While in 1995 common defense seemed to be far away and in 1996/1997 it was still kept at arm's length, it suddenly manifested itself in the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2003, seemingly to the surprise of Finnish decision-makers. Finland sought a compromise that would remain somewhere below real mutual defense. The Finnish foreign minister maintained that the European Convention's proposals risked splitting the Union and thus weakening the CFSP. Instead, he argued for some kind of "enhanced solidarity."¹⁰

Finland also convened the other non-aligned countries, Austria, Ireland and Sweden, to formulate a common stand on the issue. These countries had not been acting as a group earlier, but they now signed a letter to propose a totally different wording for the common defense clause: "If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter." Such a diluted version was not acceptable to the other countries. Instead, Italy – then holding the Council presidency – drafted a compromise on the basis of a formulation that had been used several times before. The new version did confirm the member states' obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, but added that "this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States."¹¹

The manifest reason for rejecting the common defense clause was the aim of keeping the Union together. There should not be a division of members into different categories. In the Finnish reasoning, such a division would have happened had the first version been accepted, as the non-aligned countries, or some of them, would have had to step outside.¹² This reasoning also applied to another point of the Constitutional Treaty, the permanent structured cooperation. There, the original idea was to use specific criteria to sort out some member countries capable of even deeper defense cooperation among themselves. The Finns wished to have criteria that all can fulfill, including of course Finland itself. In the end, this objective was indeed achieved.

But there were other reasons, too, for rejecting the first, simple version of the common defense clause. It was claimed that Finland could not agree to the clause because the "defense guarantees" the EU offered were not credible. Here, an element of comparison was present: NATO would look more credible. Interestingly, however, once it became clear after the French and the Dutch referenda that the Constitutional Treaty would not enter into force as such, some politicians in Finland started to long for the guarantees – that now for some reason were fully credible. As a final reason for rejection, one might consider the simple fact that commitments are taken very seriously in Finland, and the possibility of being put in a situation where it would need to defend, say, the Baltic countries against a Russian aggression, would certainly increase caution. Nowadays, when speaking about the Constitutional Treaty and its ESDP implications, the defense clause is usually bypassed, and the Finnish commentaries concentrate on "the most important decisions" of the Constitutional Treaty that have already been approved, namely the EDA, the solidarity clause and EU battlegroups.¹³

From the outside, Finland has accordingly been seen – together with other “ex-neutral countries” – as having signed under “solidarité effective” but not “solidarité de principe.”¹⁴ The twisting over the defense clause has, however, had the effect of increasing Finnish commitment to the more practical side of defense cooperation. After the December 2003 exchanges on the formulation of the defense clause, the president and the prime minister took a corrective step in underlining solidarity and assuring that Finland for one would assist a country that fell victim to an attack, albeit deciding itself about the means that it would use.¹⁵ Finland’s generous troop commitments to the battlegroups would be an example of generosity in practice, as well as its contributions to UNIFIL II in Lebanon during the Finnish Presidency of 2006.

Furthermore, the ESDP – and the parallel participation in NATO cooperation structures – has also changed Finnish security thinking or doctrine. International cooperation has come to be seen not only as enhancing the ability to participate in crisis management, but also as strengthening Finnish defense. Another novelty is the overt recognition of the fact that increased interoperability will make it easier for Finland to receive outside help. One might also sense some signs of change in the way territory is perceived. At least in theory, the earlier national or regional focus is considerably broadened: Finnish security policy is no longer limited to Finnish territory. One of the tasks of the defense forces is to maintain a capability for “managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland’s borders.”¹⁶

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was clearly the basis for the threat perception in the Finnish Defense White Paper of 2004, at least for its first part, which mentions terrorism, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, as well as global and cross-border security problems.¹⁷ Yet, when discussing the blueprints for the ESS, the government and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish parliament underlined the importance of listing both traditional¹⁸ and new threats instead of concentrating only on the latter.¹⁹

1.4 Government, Parties, Parliament

There are no cleavages to speak of between the political parties on the ESDP or on Finnish participation in EU crisis management operations. Overall, however, the foreign and security policy role of the parliament – and of the government – has grown since the Finnish EU membership and the change of the constitution in 2000. Earlier on, foreign policy was the domain of the president of the Republic. Now, it is directed by the president “in cooperation with” the government. The increasing salience of CFSP and ESDP, however, renders even this formulation problematic. All EU matters belong, as a rule, to the government, but EU foreign policy falls between the domain of the government and that of the president. The debate on the need to change the constitution further and reduce the power of the president is likely to continue. De facto, one might argue that the decision on participation is made when the EU’s Council of Ministers decides on a new operation. Subsequent national decisions going against the unanimous Council decisions would be hard to imagine.

The establishment of the battlegroups also accelerated the renewal of Finnish legislation on participation in international military crisis management operations. Among other changes, a more rapid decision-making mechanism was needed. The position of the president was, again, found problematic. In fact, the constitutional committee of the parliament took the stand that participation in EU operations should be decided by the government and not by the president. This, in turn, would have implied different decision-making modes for operations by different organizations. Finally, the Act on Peace Support Operations adopted in March 2006 states that the president is in all cases the final decision-maker. Sending Finnish troops abroad will be considered case by case by the president, the government and the parliament, with the latter considered to have a strong role in deciding on the operations.²⁰ Another change in the Act concerned dropping the requirement of a United Nations (UN) mandate for the operations in which Finland can participate. Keeping the U.N. mandate was supported by the president, but it was generally seen that there might be cases in which the EU needs to act without one, and Finland's legislation should not hamper Finnish participation in such operations. Thus, Finland can now also participate in an operation in which force is used without a U.N. mandate, albeit in exceptional circumstances only.

1.5 Public Opinion

Public opinion seems to matter increasingly in foreign policy. When it comes to the ESDP, it would seem that Finnish people in general support it even more than the politicians. Early on, as many as 60 percent of the Finns were in favor of including security guarantees in the EU constitution.²¹ Again, Finnish views on the ESDP need to be analyzed through looking at the overall attitude of Finns toward the EU; at their views on Finnish defense, on security in general and on participation in international military operations; and at their threat perception. These determine the relevance of the EU as a security political actor, and thus the openness toward more ESDP.

The general EU opinion is for the moment roughly evenly distributed among the positive, the neutral and the negative, and it has been similar for the past three years. On a more long-term note, criticism of the EU has grown. The overall tendency toward increasingly pessimistic views has recently been attributed mainly to the questions of constitutional treaty and enlargement.²² Security might be among the most positive sides of the EU. When it comes to the Finns' opinions on ESDP and the EU as a security political factor, it emerges that people actually see EU membership as the factor that contributes most to the strengthening of Finnish security. In the latest MTS²³ opinion poll from November 2006, respondents were asked to choose among factors they saw as increasing or decreasing Finnish security. The top strengthening factor was Finland's participation in the European common defense (chosen by 55 percent of respondents). The other top three security-strengthening factors were Finland's membership in the EU, the EU's counterterrorist activities and Finland's military non-alignment. The top four factors that were seen to decrease Finnish security were the U.S. war on terrorism, the increase of foreign ownership of Finnish enterprises, Russia's war against terrorism, and the potential Turkish EU membership.

When asked what the proper role of the EU in the field of security should be, the views appear somewhat different. A majority (56 percent) thought the European Union should keep to its present peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. 27 percent of the citizens, however, would prefer common European defense. Only 14 percent of the Finns believe the EU should completely abstain from military tasks. Finnish participation in the EU's rapid reaction force is approved of by 68 percent of the citizens, while one fourth disapproves.

Finnish views on the ESDP need to be seen also against the background of Finnish thinking on how the defense of Finland should be organized. The present form of general conscription is still widely supported (71 percent at present, 78 percent in 2005). What is characteristic of Finns is a considerable personal willingness to defend the country, and a very high general conscription rate: Some 80 percent of Finnish men do their military service. If Finland is attacked, Finns must defend themselves militarily, even if the outcome were uncertain; 77 percent of Finns share this view – 84 percent of men and 70 percent of women. Even in the age group of 15–24 years, 62 percent say they would defend Finland. In 2005, the figure was as high as 80 percent.

In the background, there is also the Finns' view on participation in international operations, or sending Finnish troops abroad. There, traditions oblige: Finland has a 50-year-long experience in U.N. peacekeeping, with the participation of over 40,000 persons altogether. It has also become an established part of Finnish doctrinal thinking that international participation strengthens Finnish security. This is visible also in public opinion on UNIFIL II, with 74 percent of Finns supporting Finland's decision to deploy peacekeepers to the operation. Interestingly, 71 percent see positive consequences from the perspective of security in the region, and even more, 73 percent, from the viewpoint of Finnish foreign policy.

Finnish public opinion on military non-alignment and military alliances also counts as an important background factor. The support for military non-alignment is 67 percent, while 27 percent of the population thinks that Finland should ally itself militarily. Similar results emerge from the EVA poll of 2007; 20 percent of respondents would support NATO membership (one half of them absolutely, the other half agrees more or less).²⁴

Finnish views on different alliance alternatives have also been examined. If Finland were to ally militarily, NATO would be the most favored alliance; 43 percent of the citizens favor NATO membership, with the caveat that there are no other NATO countries' troops or NATO bases in Finland during peacetime. Yet practically the same share of people (41 percent) thinks that the best option is to develop the European Union into a military alliance in which Finland would participate.

Finally, whether the EU and the ESDP seem credible in Finnish eyes also has to do with threat perception. As such, what the Finns generally perceive as threats to their security does not directly correspond with the European Security Strategy (ESS) threat perception, but even less so with a traditional military threat perception that concentrates on territorial integrity. The general public considers that the most pressing security concerns are related to the environment and climate

change as well as to organized crime. Military conflicts in the European neighborhood and terrorist attacks on Finland have been seen as the least likely security threats.²⁵ The MTS poll of November 2006 highlighted concern for the state of the global environment, the use of natural resources, nuclear weapons, international terrorism, the use of nuclear power in Russia, global warming, international organized crime as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, threat perception seems to become more “internationalized.”

1.6 Geography

Quite obviously, neighboring countries play a central role in Finnish security policy. Together with Sweden, Finland has been presenting joint initiatives on the ESDP. In the formation of the battlegroups, the Nordic framework was also found a natural one, even though not the only possibility. The battlegroups draw in Norway and Estonia as well. The Baltic countries are involved with the three Nordic EU countries in “3+3” consultations ahead of EU summits. Recent plans on deepening security and defense political cooperation between Sweden and Norway are of great interest for Finland, too.

Yet it is Russia that occupies the first seat when looking at the neighbors’ impact on Finnish security policy. Russia is seen as the basic reason behind the defense political decisions, in one way or another. In the question of joining NATO, for instance, Russia would be for some a reason to join, and for others a reason not to join. Relations between the EU and Russia, as well as between NATO and Russia, are of crucial importance for Finland. Finland has also sought to influence and shape the EU’s policies on Russia throughout its membership – for instance through the initiative of the Northern Dimension – and now finds itself faced with increasing competition by other EU countries who also claim special expertise on Russia.

One of the recent emphases on EU–Russia relations has been energy, something increasingly linked with security policy. The question of energy dependency might be less tied to security in Finland than in the EU on average. Yet energy dependence on its eastern neighbor is generally viewed as compromising Finland’s energy security. Arguments on this theme usually exclude direct political undertones: energy dependence per se, rather than dependence on Russia, is viewed as undesirable for the “security of supply.”²⁶ Finnish politicians are keen to point out that Russia is also dependent on European energy markets. As a matter of fact, one of the 1990s cornerstones of EU–Russia relations was thought to be mutual interdependence, whereby energy would play a considerable part. So also last year when Finnish President Tarja Halonen stated that the EU–Russia mutual energy interdependence is something positive, a spur to cooperation.²⁷

2. Commitment to and Implementation of ESDP Decisions in Finland

The start of the EU’s own crisis management operations in 2003 importantly redirected Finnish international participation. Finland sent a small contingent of nine staff officers to the first EU military operation EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia in 2003. Later on, it has taken part in Althea

(463 troops in all) and EUFOR DR Congo (15). It has participated in 14 different civilian operations with 128 experts. Finland did not take part, however, in the Artemis operation in 2003.

Finland early on took a positive stand toward the battlegroups. At the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on November 22, 2004, Finland announced that it would take part in two of them. Short of the capacity needed to act as a framework nation, it wanted to spread its resources more evenly and take part in two battlegroup formations. This choice has been interpreted as a political signal. The two formations are both set up by countries that emphasize the role of the United States and NATO in European security. The Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian unit underlines Nordic cooperation. The German-Dutch-Finnish battlegroup offers a good opportunity to cooperate with two strong and experienced EU and NATO countries. Overall, it is seen that the EU's battlegroups have the greatest influence on troop development in Finland today.²⁸

Finland has also eagerly supported defense industrial cooperation within the EU. It became an observer to the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) in 1997. Bringing defense industrial cooperation into the Union is important in that it enables countries with no significant armaments industry of their own to participate. The European Defense Agency (EDA) has therefore also been of immediate interest for Finland. EDA is now seen to help economize national resources, open up possibilities of joint acquisitions and create markets for the Finnish defense industry.²⁹

Recently, the secretary of state at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted how the practical implementation of ESDP has expanded from civilian and military crisis management operations and missions to battlegroups and civilian Crisis Response Teams, as well as to working on the possible use of ESDP instruments (military assets of member states) in EU disaster response. The Finnish EU presidency in 2006 worked on military capability development while not forgetting the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

Civil-military coordination (CMCO) is one of the Finnish special interests. Finland's focus has been on situational awareness with the goal of better information-sharing between the EU crisis management actors. The Finnish presidency also worked to mainstream Security Sector Reform (SSR) into the EU assistance instruments in the Western Balkans, and the EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Ex-Combatants was approved in December 2006.³⁰

3. Toward an Even Greater Commitment?

There would seem to be essentially two ways forward for European defense integration that would make Finland even more committed to the ESDP. One would be an increasing socialization of the defense administration into the EU. It is interesting that even for a non-NATO country such as Finland, socialization of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and also of defense forces³¹ seems to be with NATO rather than with the EU, as a result of the past 15 years' participation in NATO

cooperation structures. This has made the MoD a more central player in Finnish security policy than before. In February 2003, the MoD established a committee to assess the implications of a possible alliance membership on the development of Finnish defense and defense administration, including an evaluation of the costs of NATO membership. This spurred the MFA to note that these matters – and taking such initiatives – did not belong to the MoD at all. As a matter of fact, the responsibilities of the ministries are not necessarily clear in the ESDP. In Finland, crisis management would belong to the MoD “for what is not the domain of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,” but this latter has not been defined.³²

An equivalent immersion of the defense administration and the defense forces into the EU is still to come. However, there is no doubt that the increasing centrality of the ESDP and the closer involvement of national defense administration are also changing the pattern of socialization within the MoD. A defense ministers’ council would be a step in this direction. During the Finnish Presidency, there was an informal defense ministers meeting in Kittilä, where the high representative for the CFSP and NATO’s secretary general participated as well.³³ The Finnish minister of defense would not be opposed if the defense ministers also had official meetings of their own. Now, defense matters “do not get the publicity they deserve.”³⁴

Another way of increasing commitment would be to highlight the EU’s comparative advantage, or its credibility in the domain of crisis management, but also defense. The Finnish minister of defense does list a couple of such possible comparative advantages. One of them is that the EU is “characterized by realism and sense of proportion.” This includes finding the proper roles, such as helping other actors (the African Union), assuming responsibility in the right contexts (Balkans), and moving on the basis of a good exit strategy (where the Congo operation of 2006 exemplifies a successful operation with a clear beginning and a clear end). Realism also characterizes the EU’s way of connecting military measures to civilian cooperation from the start, as well as its aim of strengthening the local authorities. The comparative advantage of the EU is often seen to lie in its parallel use of civilian and military resources.³⁵ More clarity in EU–NATO relations would also be helpful to increase the credibility of both organizations. The apparent existence of two alternatives increases uncertainty.

Endnotes

- 1 Minister of Defense Dr Seppo Kääriäinen at the hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21 November 2006. http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?2969_m=2846&l=en&printer=1&s=349.
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 - 3 For a broader explanation see Hanna Ojanen: Finland and the ESDP: obliquely forwards? In Clive Archer (ed.) *New Security Issues in Northern Europe. The Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*. London: Routledge, forthcoming 2007.
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- 11 Article I–41, paragraph 7.
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- 13 Minister of Defense Dr Seppo Kääriäinen at the hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21 November 2006. http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?2969_m=2846&l=en&printer=1&s=349.
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- 15 See Jari Luoto and Timo Pesonen (2006): Suomi ja Euroopan unionin yhteinen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka. In A. Stubb (ed.) *Marginaalista ytimeen: Suomi Euroopan unionissa 1989–2003*. Helsinki: Tammi. Here p. 282.
- 16 Defense White Paper 2001, 43–4. <http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=183>
- 17 Defense White Paper 2004: 16–30.
- 18 No direct reference was made to armed attack or anything similar; as examples of traditional threats the Committee instead mentioned human rights violations and various obstacles to transition to democracy and well-functioning government.
- 19 Ulkoasiainvaliokunnan lausunto 2/2003vp. Valtioneuvoston selvitys Euroopan unionin turvallisuusstrategiasta. UaVL 2/2003 vp – UTP 15/2003 vp (November 4, 2003) at http://www.eduskunta.fi/fatkatmp/utatmp/uavl_2_2003.htm.
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- 31 More than half of Finnish military officers, 54 percent, feel that Finland should seek membership in NATO. *Helsingin Sanomat*, international edition, 15 March 2007. <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Majority+of+Finnish+military+officers+support+NATO+membership/1135225518785>.
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Sweden and ESDP

Gunilla Herolf

Like all other countries, Sweden is unique. No other country shares its geography, history or culture entirely. Reference to the fact that Sweden is a non-aligned, Nordic and small country helps to explain some Swedish policies. However, such categorizations cannot capture all the specific elements of Sweden and Swedish policy and therefore do not give the full picture of why Swedish policy has been and is the way it is. This report will bring up some of the characteristics that may explain Swedish policies toward the European Union (EU) with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the changes that they have undergone during the years after the end of the Cold War and the terms under which they may change in the future.

A relevant issue in this connection is what constitutes Sweden. The ESDP is formed and implemented by the Swedish government in a process in which the Swedish parliament and in particular the Committee on EU Affairs must also be consulted. The political parties are based in the parliament, which in turn is elected by the people in general elections. This link, signifying a parliamentary democracy, should ensure that the views held by the people in general are also shared by the government they have elected. In the Swedish case – as perhaps also in other countries – there is sometimes a wide difference in the views held by the ruling elite and the population in general. This is a factor that will be touched on in this report in connection with both the old and the new policy.¹

Are there national impediments for Sweden vis-à-vis ESDP? The answer to this question depends partly on how the ESDP is perceived. The argument made in this report is that both the ESDP itself and Swedish policies are multifaceted and in a process of development. Therefore, the answer will depend on the future development of both.

1. What is ESDP?

The perception of the ESDP is usually in a broad meaning shared within each of EU's member countries in the sense that certain aspects of it are seen by most people to be the crucial ones. It is also obvious that the interpretation of what the ESDP constitutes varies among the member states of the European Union. The ESDP might in some countries be perceived to be synonymous with the agreements made or with the present state of activities, whereas in others it is defined in terms of the visions, the hopes and the ambitions of the countries in question.

Above a certain basic level, it is not unnatural that countries read into the definition of the ESDP the characteristics they feel most comfortable with or value most highly. This means, for example, that countries with a federalist constitution see the goal of forming a common European defense as a central element of the ESDP, whereas others, whether because of non-alignment or closeness

to the United States, prefer to remain at the present stage in this respect and therefore see other aspects, such as crisis management or the buildup of military capabilities, as more central. In the same way, member states may vary in the degree of European independence vis-à-vis the United States that they see as inherent in the concept of the ESDP.

To a high degree, the Swedish view on the ESDP relates to its role of alleviating threats and contributing to stability in Europe and globally. This is above all the field where Sweden's own aims and ambitions go hand in hand with a strong role for the ESDP. The September 2004 "Government Proposition on the future of Swedish defense" describes the EU as follows: "The EU is a political alliance. The Union has an increasing role as actor in the global economy as well as in foreign and security policy. With the enlargement of the EU, security is strengthened in the whole of Europe. Membership in the EU gives us security and creates solidarity among the member countries. Next to the United Nations, the European Union is our most important security political forum. Strengthened EU capability is equivalent to strengthened Swedish capability. The EU countries strive to deepen cooperation within security and defense policy. Among others, this has been manifested through the European Security Strategy (ESS), in which member states have jointly formulated a security-related view on the exterior world. EU members have agreed on strategic aims and given a guideline as to how the EU foreign, security and defense policy (CFSP and ESDP) should be formed and developed. Sweden has actively supported the development of the EU's capabilities to prevent armed conflicts and contribute to international peace-support activities. Sweden works within the EU to strengthen the ability even further in order to meet our common security threats in an efficient way. We want to see a more solidary EU, which takes a greater responsibility on a global level."²

The view on the EU/ESDP of the new four-party center-right government,³ formed after the general election of September 2006, is seen in the "Statement of Government Policy" in the yearly parliamentary debate on foreign affairs (February 14, 2007). Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, after declaring that Sweden is a non-aligned country, stated that after its entry into the European Union, a political alliance, Sweden has broken away from a tradition dating back to 1812 in which Swedish policy was ultimately about trying to avoid being drawn into the European war that was always a threat. The fall of the Soviet dictatorship, he declared, created a new situation, in which "it was natural for Sweden to join the European Union and, by participating in the Union's efforts to gradually strengthen cooperation and integration between the democracies of Europe, help build a new order of peace in our part of the world. A vital task for Sweden today is to contribute to even stronger European cooperation, making the Union the force in the service of peace, freedom and reconciliation that the world more and more obviously needs."⁴

Scrutiny of the Swedish documents makes it clear that for Sweden, common defense is not part of the picture. This is natural in the sense that Sweden joined the EU without any promises to renounce its non-alignment. (However, Austria, Finland and Sweden declared that while remaining non-aligned, they would not prevent others from forming a common defense.) But there is also another aspect of this, in that the ESS is spoken about as the new focal point for the EU in a way that makes it similar to the role that the common defense has played for some other

countries – not as a final goal but as a guideline for action and thereby also a yardstick for measuring solidarity.

Sweden clearly harbors great ambitions for the role that the European Union should assume within the field of security and defense in Europe and globally. What can be deduced from the formulations stating these ambitions is also the lack of importance given to non-alignment; Sweden perceives itself as no different from other countries in terms of threats and does not see any impediments to creating capabilities for international tasks or participating in operations on the same terms as other European countries.

2. Which Factors Determine Sweden's Position and Interests Regarding ESDP?

2.1 Threat Perceptions

Sweden, while non-aligned, shared throughout the Cold War the threat perceptions of other West European countries. The Swedish defense forces, fairly strong for a small country, were focused on territorial defense of the country against an attack by the Warsaw Pact. In spite of a doctrine speaking about non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in case of war, some secret cooperation with Western powers took place, aiming at Swedish involvement in a possible war.⁵ In addition, while militarily non-aligned, Sweden was neither politically nor economically neutral. People in general felt safe and protected by Swedish non-alignment and defense forces, whereas a small elite was aware that Sweden would not have been able to stay out of a third world war.

When the Berlin Wall fell, the effects for Sweden were just as vast as they were for NATO members. As the Soviet Union changed politically and its military force deteriorated, a number of new threats took its place. Efforts to stabilize the situation within the Baltic Sea region became one of the first tasks, and like many other challenges after the Cold War they were primarily dealt with by civilian means. The Yugoslavian wars were even more typical of the new world in their mix of origins as well as of the means that became necessary to meet them and create stability in the area. For Sweden, this meant a range of tasks that included contributing soldiers to U.N. forces from an early stage and thereafter also being part of NATO-led and later EU forces. Sweden has furthermore accepted very large numbers of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. Thus, while the wars were limited in geographic scope, their effects spread widely across Europe.

Sweden does not see an armed military attack against Sweden alone as likely within a foreseeable time (at least 10 years). On the other hand, military incidents cannot be ruled out, nor can the potential development of major threats. For this reason, Sweden needs to maintain a basic military capacity. The competence and the resources of Swedish defense forces should now, it is argued, be used where they can best contribute to increasing the security of Sweden. In the situation in which Sweden finds itself today, the focus should be on developing the Swedish contribution to international crisis management. Such efforts made by Sweden serve to further international peace and security and thereby to strengthen Swedish security.⁶

While this view is the dominant one, some analysts have lately voiced their concerns as regards the development in Russia. The reasons are the political development in this country and the new strategic situation for Northern Europe, caused by the energy deposits in the Barents Sea and the new energy distribution links in Europe, including the Baltic Sea. These factors might give cause for Sweden to reconsider its allocation of military forces, they argue, rather than abandoning the territorial defense concept entirely.⁷

The position taken toward the ESDP may also in a Euro-transatlantic perspective be influenced by the threat assessments related to the policies and activities of the United States. Sweden has generally seen good transatlantic cooperation as useful for world security and argued for the EU to use already existing NATO (i.e., United States) resources in order to avoid waste. With the present criticism against U.S. policies, this might change. The Swedish general public has shown in a poll a great distrust toward the U.S. war on terrorism, with only 20 percent of respondents viewing the policies as beneficial for Swedish security and as many as 51 percent finding them detrimental.⁸

2.2 The Role of Non-Alignment Today

Non-alignment is a strong reason for the Swedish interpretation of the ESDP to focus less on institutions and more on activities. The Swedish public is firmly for continued non-alignment, and though the present Swedish government includes two parties that favor membership in NATO, the two others do not. No change could take place without a general referendum preceding it.

However, non-alignment does not suffice as explanation to give the whole picture of Swedish attitudes to solidarity and defense obligations, and it should not be confused with neutrality, which in Swedish vocabulary is the policy that might or might not be taken in a war situation. In Sweden, as in other non-aligned countries in Europe, the interpretation of the scope allowed for the policy of a non-aligned country has changed tremendously since 1989. Starting in 1992, the term neutrality policy was abolished and the expression "aiming at neutrality in war" was changed to one in which neutrality was only an option. The Government Proposition of September 2004 contains the following statement: "It is hard to imagine that Sweden would be neutral in the event of an armed attack on another EU country."⁹ This is as far as a non-aligned country can go without formally renouncing its non-aligned status.

The views of the general public are complex. While, as mentioned above, the Swedish public supports continued non-alignment, in a public opinion poll taken in late 2006 support for NATO membership but also the level of uncertainty have increased at the expense of continued adherence to non-alignment. When asked whether Sweden should apply for NATO membership, 23 percent of respondents were positive (in 2005: 17 percent), whereas 46 percent supported continued non-alignment outside NATO (2005: 67 percent) and 31 percent were undecided (2005: 16 percent).¹⁰ When asked whether they supported Swedish membership in a common EU defense, the categories differed and the results are consequently hard to compare; 11 percent

declared themselves to be entirely for, 19 percent mainly for and 31 percent doubtful, whereas 15 percent were mainly against, 14 percent were totally against and 10 percent had no view.¹¹

An important factor in this connection is that non-alignment is not entirely associated with security. When asked whether they considered non-alignment to improve the situation for Sweden in terms of security, 48 percent saw it as a positive factor, whereas 6 percent saw it as negative, as many as 27 percent found it to be lacking in importance for security, and 19 percent had no view on this. Even more striking is that fact that Swedish membership in the EU was seen as more important than non-alignment for Swedish security, with 50 percent of the respondents seeing a positive relationship.¹² (See more in section 4.)

Many in Sweden today express a general view that while non-alignment does not mean much for Swedish security, there is no strong reason to join NATO either: Sweden already participates in the majority of NATO tasks and particularly in the ones that are important for European security today. The debate is more prominent in the daily newspapers than within or among the political parties. The biggest daily, *Dagens Nyheter*, has long advocated NATO membership, using arguments such as the need for Sweden to have full influence in operations in which its forces participate, for example Afghanistan.¹³

2.3 Traditions in Swedish Policy

While Sweden, unlike Finland, was not prevented under any formal treaty from joining the European Community (and had actually considered it several times), the element of foreign policy had been seen as a problem, in light of possible reactions from the Soviet Union that might upset what was seen as a delicate balance in the north. The formal application was submitted in 1991. Unlike in Finland, economy rather than security was the major reason for applying for membership. Security was also important, playing a role as a means to work in creating stability in the neighborhood, not as a protection for Sweden. With no security-related concerns preventing Swedish membership in the European Community (EC), and with NATO having evolved into a new type of organization, Sweden was eager to join the former as member and join in the activities not related to territorial defense of the latter.

Swedish policy has traditionally been internationally minded; in contrast to several other non-aligned countries, membership in the League of Nations/United Nations (U.N.) ranked higher than concern for a strict interpretation of neutrality policy. Sweden has also traditionally been engaged in seeking international roles and assignments. The effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall, while very positive in terms of security, was to leave Sweden outside the two now dominant organizations, NATO and the EC. This was a further reason to seek membership in the EC and cooperation with NATO.

There is in addition a strong tradition of participation in U.N. peacekeeping. Starting in 1948 (and on previous occasions also within the League of Nations), Sweden has been one of the most heavily engaged countries. People at all levels of Swedish society strongly endorse the United

Nations and continued participation in peacekeeping activities when under a U.N. mandate, which also contributes to explaining the fact that traditional United Nations efforts could easily be transferred to the EU (and also to NATO).

As Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995, it became an observer to the Western European Union (WEU) as well. Because the WEU was also a military alliance, non-aligned countries could not join as members. Sweden, calling itself an “active observer,” sought from the beginning to extend its possibilities to participate in WEU discussions more actively than rules originally permitted, and these were gradually changed in favor of the observers. Another step in this direction was the acceptance by the other EU states of the Finnish-Swedish Petersberg initiative, launched in 1996, which had the advantage of not compromising non-alignment while allowing involvement and participation. Decision-making on the Petersberg tasks was now moved to the EU, in which Sweden was a full member with the right to participate in discussions from the outset. The right to participate in the WEU’s implementation of the tasks was important as well. This also meant that the observers stood on equal footing with the others within the WEU when planning these tasks. In addition, transferring tasks from a military alliance made it clear to all (not least to domestic critics of the EU) that non-alignment was not endangered.

All the three factors – threat perceptions, non-alignment and the traditions in Swedish policy – are thus seen as formed by the present political situation in Europe in a way to lead to closer relations and commitment to the EU, as well as to other organizations. They are also closely related to each other; the new types of threats contribute to making non-alignment less relevant and allow Swedish international policy to be freed from the considerations that it previously had to take into account.

3. The Swedish ESDP Policy Today

3.1 The Wide Framework of Organizations

Sweden often views the EU in a context that includes other organizations and puts the focus on the tasks rather than the organizations. Sweden and the world community at large, it is stated, have a responsibility to meet the threats that exist against our common security. Through conflict prevention and conflict management tasks in the area in question, the outside world can contribute to stabilization and thereby limit the effects of the conflicts.¹⁴ Several organizations are now jointly responsible for such tasks, for instance the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the EU – of which the United Nations and the EU are particularly important.

The general public has the same view of the institutions; the United Nations, the EU and NATO are the three most important, in that order. When asked whether the organizations contribute to peace and security in the European neighborhood, 86 percent of the respondents consider that the United Nations gives an essential or some contribution; the corresponding figure for the European Union is 75 percent and for NATO 57 percent.¹⁵ In the Swedish view, the United Nations is the only

organization or body that may give international legitimacy to the use of force. The new government has pledged to remain a staunch supporter of the United States. A high percentage of the population supports Swedish participation in military interventions; 65 percent say Yes to this when undertaken under a U.N. mandate and 10 percent also without it.¹⁶ When asked whether they believe it is right that the United Nations also participates actively in military peace-enforcement actions, the endorsement goes down to 56 percent.¹⁷ When asked whether people support Swedish participation in U.N. missions in which there is a possibility that Swedish soldiers could be killed, 61 percent say Yes. The share of respondents undecided on all these questions was fairly high, varying between 15 and 23 percent.¹⁸

NATO is a close partner as well for Sweden, primarily through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and in peacekeeping operations. Swedish systems have gradually been adapted to NATO standards to make close cooperation possible. Swedish troops working under NATO command have been a frequent phenomenon without causing any political or other problems, whether in the field or in public opinion at home. Sweden now participates in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a troop of around 330 persons and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 440 persons.¹⁹ Still, according to the Government Proposition of 2004, as the relation between EU and NATO has been strengthened, the Swedish relation to NATO will predominantly be defined through Swedish membership in the EU.²⁰

With regard to NATO, the new foreign minister, Carl Bildt, has declared that while the previous government did not perform badly vis-à-vis the organization, there was previously in his mind a kind of *Berührungangst* and not much willingness to speak about it. For NATO relations, the change of government has led to closer cooperation as Sweden will now join NATO's pool of C-17 aircraft. Sweden will also for the first time now "consider participation" in the Alliance's naval operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean.²¹

3.2 The Wide Framework of Tasks

Sweden has more than many other countries connected other issues to that of CFSP/ESDP. Foreign development, trade and security policies are seen as closely interlinked and capable of contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable peace. As part of this policy, Sweden has also long argued for free trade in the context of the Barcelona Process.

The enlargement issue is an area in which Swedish views currently differ from those of many other countries within the EU. Sweden sees enlargement as closely connected to security and advocates ongoing enlargement of the Union. The government has argued for a European Union that remains open to all European democracies which meet the requirements of membership. This includes a democratic Turkey that fully respects the rights of individuals and minorities. Europe should also, Sweden thinks, wholeheartedly recognize and support Ukraine's choice of a European path and keep the door to the European Union open.²²

3.3 The Nordic Component

Typically, Nordic cooperation has never been the first priority for the Nordic countries. Together the five (or actually four since Iceland is geographically too far away to be part of the group in a security sense) have not been strong enough to create a credible deterrent unit. The Nordic countries have therefore sought their individual solutions to achieve security. With this factor as a given, there has been also a continuous wish to increase Nordic cooperation as much as possible.

This possibility came with the end of the Cold War and has taken several forms. Institutionally, it meant that the Nordic Council could now include security and defense cooperation. The Nordic Council at times works as a "5+3" body, then including the three Baltic states. The Nordic countries have also cooperated with each other as well as with the Baltic countries when assisting in building up the latter's military capabilities. Furthermore, they have cooperated in arms acquisition and above all in crisis management tasks. Common units in former Yugoslavia and, lately, the forming of the Nordic Battlegroup are part of this trend. A recent initiative concerns Norwegian–Swedish cooperation through a joint unit to be sent to Darfur during 2007.

These initiatives and projects point to some driving forces in addition to the institutional considerations. One of them is the large-scale efficiencies found in cooperation between these geographically close countries. Another is the fact that they share the threats of the region and a wish to stabilize it. A third one, more related to such activities as the Nordic Battlegroup, arises from Nordic similarities in culture and (except for Finland) language as well as a general wish to cooperate in all areas where this is possible.

3.4 Policy and Commitment toward ESDP

The extent to which Sweden engages in the ESDP would need to be compared to that of other countries in order to be evaluated. In various ways, EU member states refrain from committing themselves totally and solely to European endeavors. France and the UK, for example, because of their colonial past, have an independent global policy in addition to CFSP/ESDP. For many countries, not least the newest member states, the loyalty conflict between NATO/the United States and the EU is a crucial matter. In the case of Sweden and some others, non-alignment is the obvious impediment to certain policies. However, the picture is increasingly varied and, based on institutional affiliations, it is difficult to ascertain how far a country is prepared to commit itself to the ESDP.

At the same time, uncertainty in the EU itself has grown as the organization is now both very large and without a clear sense of direction while waiting for a solution to the constitutional crisis. The situation has in several ways led to an increased re-nationalization in which major countries have taken the lead in the name of the EU, such as in the case of the EU–3 and Iran, especially at the early stage before Javier Solana became part of the process.

While it remains non-aligned and an intergovernmentalist country, Sweden is increasingly coming

to recognize the benefits of strong and efficient institutions. In terms of the future institutional development of the European Union, the Swedish Government therefore supports Germany's efforts during its EU Presidency to solve the impasse of the Constitutional Treaty. Sweden also hopes that the new proposal will be close to the original one, which it regards as a well-balanced compromise between different interests. Furthermore, it wants to see more use of majority decisions in foreign and security policy and an increased use of constructive abstention rather than blocking of decisions.²³

On the military side, Sweden supports the idea of a common military planning headquarters in Brussels, which, mostly because of British resistance, has not been established yet. Sweden does not see the present situation with five existing military planning headquarters (supplied by France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece) as the ideal for the ESDP. While it functions adequately as a stopgap measure in the absence of a headquarters, in practice such a system is a form of re-nationalization of the EU.

Sweden is well aware that many categorize it primarily in terms of its military non-alignment. From the start, Sweden has been active in proposing ideas for ESDP, such as the initiatives pertaining to the Petersberg tasks and to civilian crisis management. The Petersberg initiative, while generally supported by others, can also be interpreted as a proposal to divert military obligations from the EU, and the civilian crisis management initiative at first met some resistance from those who saw it as created at the expense of military crisis management. Therefore, even among their adherents, the two initiatives did little to clear the image of Sweden as a country that sought to keep a safe distance from closer commitment.

Some Swedish policies may have been at least partly pursued with the intent of making others aware that Sweden, although non-aligned, wants to be considered an active and engaged member of ESDP cooperation. One example of this is that Sweden has participated in all ESDP operations undertaken to date. Some of the missions are very small, and the Swedish contributions are accordingly small as well. Still, there is a signal sent and received.²⁴

In the same vein, Sweden participated in the only peace-enforcement operation undertaken so far by the European Union. This was the Artemis operation in Congo in 2003, in which France was the lead nation. The mission was undertaken at the request of the United Nations in an effort to stabilize security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia, eastern DR Congo. A large number of countries participated, but the special forces engaged in the most dangerous tasks were French and Swedish.

Another activity that raises Swedish visibility is its leadership of the Nordic Battlegroup. The Nordic rapid-reaction force is to be on standby for EU-led international crisis management missions during the first half of 2008. It will include 2,400 soldiers, of which Sweden will contribute some 2,000. Other contributing countries are Finland, Norway and Estonia. Finland contributes support functions, Norway logistics functions and Estonia security and force protection. The British military planning headquarters supports the battlegroup in the area of command and control.²⁵

The new government formed after the September 2006 general elections has put a strong emphasis on the EU foreign, security and defense policy. In many ways, however, it is more a matter of change of tone than a substantial change of policy; the similarity between the former and the present government is strong. The government has declared that it wants to contribute to a more active EU policy both in Brussels and in Stockholm on the principal issues that lie ahead. To the extent possible, Sweden should be in the core of the EU.²⁶ Concrete evidence of a strong interest in the ESDP could be seen as the new government gave additional funding in order to raise the level of Swedish peacekeepers simultaneously engaged from currently around 1,000 persons to around 2,000. Up to and including 2009, the increase is expected to be SEK 1.35 millions (€ 145,000).²⁷

In his speech to Parliament in the yearly debate on foreign and security policy, Foreign Minister Carl Bildt gave a list of priorities in foreign affairs. First on the list were global matters. According to Bildt, "Sweden will take a proactive role in developing the European Union as a global actor, especially in peace and security policy. We want to work to ensure that the EU is well equipped through a broad and effective foreign policy to meet the global challenges facing Europe and the world. On that basis we also want to strengthen transatlantic cooperation."²⁸

One of the reasons for Swedish engagement on a global level is surely similar to that of the experiences of the Yugoslavian wars: Just as in the European case, Sweden is affected by global events. As for Iraq, the situation now is that approximately half the Iraqi refugees arriving in Europe choose to seek asylum in Sweden. There are two reasons for this. One is the country's relatively liberal asylum laws; the other is the fact that Sweden has previously received many Iraqis, whose relatives now join them. For Sweden, this is an increasing problem. Hence, Sweden has pleaded for solidarity among EU members in order to share the burden more evenly.²⁹

Public opinion is generally positive toward ESDP, which overall has been more appreciated than EU membership as such. While two years ago the difference was striking, it has now evened out. This is primarily because support for EU membership has taken a sharp upturn, beginning in the spring 2006 Eurobarometer survey, when endorsement of EU membership rose from 39 percent to 49 percent. This figure was repeated in the latest Eurobarometer survey. Overall, however, support for membership is somewhat below the EU average of 53 percent.³⁰

As mentioned previously in connection with views on non-alignment, 50 percent of the respondents see the EU, and 51 percent see ESDP, as beneficial for Swedish security, as compared with 48 percent for non-alignment. While these figures might need further analysis, a guess is that appreciation for the EU in this context might depend on several things. One reason might be that according to the Eurobarometer surveys, Swedes generally see the EU as a peace project in itself; another may be beneficial effects seen from EU enlargement.³¹

As regards ESDP, 58 percent want Sweden to contribute to participation in the rapid reaction forces (with 17 percent saying No and 25 percent having no view). When people are asked about Swedish leadership of the Nordic Battlegroup, 43 percent hold a positive opinion, whereas 28 are negative and 32 have no view. A striking phenomenon is the large number of people who have no view, a group that increased in 2006 in comparison with previous years.³²

4. Impediments to Deeper Swedish Involvement

As described in the preceding pages, the Swedish attitude toward ESDP is marked by duality – keeping a safe distance removed from the common defense that some others see as a natural final step on the one hand, and a strong commitment toward many other aspects of ESDP on the other. Today, there is no clear and unequivocal definition or perception of the ESDP. Its development has proceeded on an ad hoc basis, partly as a response to immediate crises and the need to resolve them. Generally, therefore, the Swedish attitude toward the ESDP, and hence the possible impediments to deeper involvement, will be very much related to what ESDP will become in the future.

For Sweden, as for other countries, history plays a role in its relations to institutions. Sweden has not participated in any war for about 200 years. This coincides roughly with the period of Swedish non-alignment, which for most of the time has been accompanied by a neutrality policy – sometimes less adhered to, sometimes more. With the Soviet Union as a militarily strong neighbor and with an adversary political system, Swedish society prepared for the worst, seeing the need for a comparatively strong defense. Coupled with this was an international engagement channeled through the United Nations, which for many years could not have been directed toward Europe with its block-to-block stalemate.

For many Swedes, the historical absence of military alliances, coupled with familiarity with military matters, including military engagements abroad, is even today shaping the attitude toward NATO. A common sentiment within large parts of society is that if NATO membership was not necessary before, there is even less reason now. However, there exists a strong endorsement of various forms of crisis management with which Swedes have associated themselves for many decades. The wide framework of Swedish ESDP policies was described above: seeing ESDP cooperation as also including close cooperation with other organizations, bringing in other areas than security and other countries outside the group of EU members. This attitude also means that Swedes will commit themselves less to an ESDP built on European identity and as a counterweight to the United States than to one that centers more on functional cooperation with other institutions, in particular the United Nations. The present stalemate of the Union also carries some dangers. Seen from the Swedish side, a development in the EU that involves increased re-nationalization, with countries pursuing their own individual interests in various parts of the world, would lower their interest, as would the development toward a “Fortress Europe.”

Sweden has changed during its years of EU membership, but in many ways it is still a traditional intergovernmental country. In addition, Sweden is a small state for which increased use of majority decision-making might mean that it will be overruled. When compared to that in other EU countries, Swedish support for increased integration is low. A political union is supported by 42 percent (only Austria, Finland and the UK having lower figures), a common foreign and security policy by 51 percent and a common security and defense policy by 54 percent. The higher support for the security and defense policy can be explained by the fact that Swedes see the most important role for the EU to be in the field of security, in particular the fight against terrorism.³³

A problem for the ESDP has traditionally rested in the low support of the EU. A change has taken place, however, as seen in the Eurobarometer during 2006. Not only has the endorsement of EU membership increased from 39 percent to 49 percent, as noted above. The Constitutional Treaty and the Euro are now both supported by more than 50 percent of respondents.³⁴ Still, there is a problem for higher commitment insofar as Swedes generally see the EU as less trustworthy than people from other countries do.³⁵

Public relations is a major impediment to a shift toward a more positive attitude. Many Swedes regard the EU as a bureaucratic organization that deals too much with petty things such as Swedish wet snuff. The lack of transparency and the absurdities of the Common Agricultural Policy add to the picture. People not engaged in EU matters cannot readily get a view of what the Union accomplishes in terms of crisis management and stabilization in Europe, since little of this is reported in the press. Conversely, stories of failure and abuse of various kinds seem to be catching journalists' attention to a far higher degree.

5. What Does It Take to Make Sweden (Even) More Committed to ESDP?

The issue of increased Swedish commitment to ESDP will need to take into consideration the element of time. Swedish security and defense policies have undergone substantial changes since the end of the Cold War and continue to do so. First and foremost, this is a reaction to the changing world where common threats call for common means to meet them. On paper, non-alignment constitutes a great difference between certain countries in Europe and others. Looking at actual policies today it means little, and in terms of solidarity, if developments took a turn for the worse it might mean nothing at all. However, non-alignment should be recognized as a problem in the way it further complicates cooperation that is already complicated because of the large number of organizations and countries involved.

A striking element in answers to the questions posed in the polls is the very large element of indecision/no view, signifying a lack of knowledge of the issues. While some of these issues are complicated, more information is certainly necessary. Time will hopefully have its impact here, too, as well as continued familiarity with the issues through ongoing cooperation that will gradually diminish apprehensions.

An increased commitment to ESDP must build on a continued Swedish evaluation of the EU as the primary means for pursuing Swedish interests and values. The possible dangers in this respect were outlined in the preceding section, but thus far the ESDP has taken a steady course in a direction which in Swedish eyes is instrumental both for meeting the particular European threat perceptions and with a view to global action. Sweden has also found it a positive experience to have its own initiatives accepted by the other members. Accordingly, right now there is no reason to imagine that the ESDP, which is today seen as a highly prioritized area, would become anything else if the present course continues.

In Sweden, as in some other countries in Europe, there seems to be a rift between the elite and other groups of society in their attitude toward the EU. Certainly a Union that more clearly addressed the needs of the people would increase the willingness of the Swedish population to endorse it. The use of military and other means to help people in need, for example through rescue operations in response to natural disasters, is one way to demonstrate the usefulness of the EU to those who otherwise have little contact with and knowledge of this aspect of the Union. Similarly, for Sweden as for other countries, concern and solidarity received in situations where it is more deeply affected than others would be a positive experience. One example would be a common asylum policy that divided the burden more equally. For Sweden right now this concerns the heavy influx of Iraqi refugees.

Looking at the EU members today, each of them turns out to be a bit different from the others. Sweden, like others, has its special interests and values that it seeks to protect, but as described in this report none of them is of a character that sets Sweden apart from other countries in a more than marginal way. The task for all EU members now is to work together to meet the new challenges. While these challenges are in many ways daunting, it is also a fact that no other area has developed as fast as CFSP/ESDP. Clearly, the perception in Europe today, in accordance with the ESS, is that all European countries face the same threats – and that more and more of these can be withstood only through cooperation. This basic agreement makes differences among countries less relevant and, when facing the consequences of disagreement, easier to overcome. In this important respect, as in many others, the situation in Europe has never been as hopeful as it is today.

Endnotes

- 1 One important example of the fact that the views held by parliamentarians are not always representative of their voters concerns the draft Constitutional Treaty. Swedish basic law does not require decisions of this kind to be taken by general referenda, and the planned procedure (before the Dutch and French Nos disrupted the procedure) was to put it to a vote in the parliament in December 2005, at which it was expected to have been accepted. At the time the Swedish population was growing increasingly negative to the Constitution, and it is assumed that a general referendum at that time would have resulted in a No.
 - 2 Regeringens proposition 2004/05, *Vårt framtida försvar* [Government proposition 2004/05. *Our Future Defense*], 23 Sept. 2004, p. 15.
 - 3 The four parties are the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, the Centre Party and the Moderate Party.
 - 4 Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2007, pp. 1–2.
 - 5 Swedish Commission on Neutrality policy, *Had There Been a War...Preparations for the Reception of Military Assistance 1949–1969*. Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Translation of Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1994: p. 11 (Statsrådsberedningen: Stockholm, 1994), p. 31.
 - 6 Regeringens proposition...(see note 2), p. 12.
 - 7 Bo Pellnäs, "Tänk om, försvarsministern" ["Reconsider, Defence Minister"], *Svenska Dagbladet*, 14 January 2007; "Ny syn på Ryssland kan ändra svenskt försvar" ["New view on Russia may change Swedish defense"], *Dagens Nyheter*, 14 February 2007.
 - 8 15 percent saw them as lacking importance for Sweden and 15 percent had no view on this. See *Opinion 2006*, Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar [National Swedish Board for Psychological Defense], Figure 7, p. 41.
 - 9 Regeringens proposition... (see note 2), p. 23 (author's translation).
 - 10 *Opinion 2006*, (see note 8), Figure 26, p. 60 and Figure 27, p. 61.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, Figure 20, p. 54.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, Figure 7, p. 41.
 - 13 "Skicka NATO-ansökan med trupperna" ["Send NATO application with the troops"], *Dagens Nyheter*, 30 November 2006.
 - 14 Regeringens proposition... (see note 2), p. 13.
 - 15 *Opinion 2006* (see note 8) Figure 8, p. 42.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, Figure 15, p. 49.
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17 Ibid., Figure 11, p. 45.

18 Ibid., Figure 13, p. 47.

19 See www.mil.se (website of the Swedish defense forces).

20 Regeringens proposition... (see note 2), p. 17.

21 Mikael Odenberg, Minister of Defence, "Våra viktigaste framtidsfrågor" ["Our most important issues for the future"], *Folk och Försvar* [Society and Defense], Sälen, January 14, 2007.

22 Statement of Government Policy (see note 4), pp. 3–4. See also Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, "Open wide Europe's doors. Who wants to be 'absorbed' by the European Union and who can design the 'borders' of Europe?," *International Herald Tribune*, November 8, 2006.

23 Cecilia Malmström, Minister for EU Affairs (2006): "Tal på Utrikespolitiska Föreningen i Uppsala" [Speech at Uppsala Association of International Affairs], December 4, 2006, <http://regeringen.se/sb/d/7415/a/73551>.

24 See Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Graduation ceremony ESDC High Level Training Course. Stockholm, March 17, 2006.

25 www.mil.se, website of the Swedish defense forces.

26 "Reinfeldt vill få fart på EU" ["Reinfeldt wants to increase the speed of the EU"], *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 25, 2006.

27 Mikael Odenberg (see note 21).

28 Statement of Government Policy (see note 4), p. 16.

29 Tobias Billström, Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, and Cecilia Malmström, Minister for EU Affairs. "Iraqis taking refuge in Sweden," *International Herald Tribune*, January 13–14, 2007; "EU måste ta ansvar för Irak" ["The EU must take responsibility for Iraq"], *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 12, 2007. See also Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, "Sverige redo öka insatserna för ett stabilare Irak" ["Sweden is prepared to increase its help for a more stable Iraq"] *Dagens Nyheter*, March 1, 2007.

30 26 percent believe that EU membership is bad for Sweden whereas 25 percent consider it to be neither good nor bad. See European Commission: National Report, Sweden, Autumn 2006, p. 13.

31 Ibid., p. 15.

32 Opinion 2006 (see note 8), Figure 17, p. 51, and Figure 18, p. 18.

33 European Commission (see note 30), pp. 20–22.

34 Ibid. p. 22.

35 Ibid., p. 11.

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